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I. Naval Operations and Law 
I nternational law comprises both customary and treaty components} Customary law is based upon the incident-by-incident and case-by-case 
development through practical experience and an implicit acceptance by a 
preponderance of governments. Treaty law is the express agreement of states 
on particular subjects. International law is made and developed by 
governments in order to protect governmental interests, and among these 
interests is the efficient and lawful use of armed forces. Since the time of 
The Prize Cases,2 decided by the u.S. Supreme Court during the Civil War, 
the law of armed conflict has applied to any situation where international 
armed conflict exists factually. Consequently, it is not necessary that there 
be a declaration of war or a so-called technical "state of war" to make the 
law applicable. This is codified in a common provision which appears in each 
of the four Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims (1949) 
which states that the Conventions shall apply "to all cases of declared war 
or of any other armed conflict" between the state parties "even if the state 
of war is not recognized by one of them. "3 
The binding force of international law is stated directly in Navy 
Regulations: 
At all times a commander shall observe, and require his command to observe, the 
principles of international law. Where necessary to fulfillment of this responsibility, 
a departure from other provisions of Navy Regulations is authorized.4 
The Chief of Naval Operations has the responsibility to ensure that the 
obligations of the Navy under the law of armed conflict are observed and 
enforced. Alleged violations of the law of armed conflict are to be promptly 
reported and thoroughly investigated. Corrective action is to be taken whenever 
required.5 At the present time officers of the Judge Advocate General's Corps 
provide legal advice concerning Navy responsibilities under international law 
including the law of armed conflict. In the early history of the Navy, when 
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such legal advice was not provided, naval officers were held to a high standard 
of compliance with law, both international and domestic. An example is 
provided by Little v. Barreme,6 a unanimous decision of the u.s. Supreme Court 
written by Chief Justice John Marshall. In the limited naval war with France, 
the Congress provided by statute for the capture of vessels meeting certain 
criteria engaged in commerce with France. The President issued instructions 
to the Navy to capture particular vessels including, as found by the Supreme 
Court, vessels not covered by the statute. Captain Little, USN, captured The 
Flying Fish in compliance with the instructions of the President and sent it in 
for adjudication in the prize court which determined that the capture was not 
authorized by the statute. The owners of the vessel incurred damages of $8,504.00 
as a result of the unlawful capture and detention and they sued Captain Little 
personally for this amount. The Supreme Court, while expressing sympathy 
for Captain Little, who had acted in good faith, held that he was personally 
liable for the damages caused by the unlawful act. The breadth of the holding 
in this case is accurately summarized in the headnote which appears in the official 
U.S. Supreme Court Reports: 
The commander of a ship of war of the United States, in obeying his instructions from 
the President of the United States, acts at his peril: if those instructions are not strictly 
warranted by law, he is answerable in damages to any person injured by their execution. 
At the time that judgment was entered against Captain Little, he was 
required by statute to obey the orders of his superiors without any 
qualification concerning the lawful or unlawful character of the order.7 At 
the present time officers of the armed services are only required to obey 
"lawful" orders as prescribed by article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, entitled "Failure to obey order or regulation. " This article provides: 
Any person subject to this chapter who-
(1) violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation; 
(2) having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by a member of the armed forces, 
which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey the order; or 
(3) is derelict in the performance of his duties; shall be punished as a court-martial may 
direct.8 
The law of naval targeting is based upon three fundamental principles 
which are stated in the U.S. Navy's Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval 
Operations: 
1. The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited. 
2. It is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population as such. 
3. Distinctions must be made between combatants and non-combatants, to the effect 
that non-combatants be spared as much as possible.9 
Because the law of armed conflict (LOAC) is an eminently practical law 
which takes into account military efficiency, these basic legal principles are 
consistent with the military principles of objective, mass, and economy of 
force. The law requires that only militarily significant objectives be attacked, 
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but it permits the use of sufficient mass to destroy those objectives. Economy 
of force requires that no more effort should be directed against a military 
objective than is necessary to accomplish it. In addition, the law of naval 
targeting provides that all reasonable precautions must be taken to ensure 
that only military objectives are targeted and that non-combatants and civilian 
objects are spared as much as possible from the effects of armed conflict. 
The most important treaties which are applicable to naval targeting and 
lawful objects of attack or capture are the following: 
Declaration of Paris Concerning Maritime Law (1856)10 
Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land (1907)11 
Hague Convention (VI) Relating to the Status of Enemy Merchant Ships 
at the Outbreak of Hostilities (1907)12 
Hague Convention (VII) Relating to the Conversion of Merchant Ships 
into War-Ships (1907)13 
Hague Convention (VIII) Relative to the Laying of Automatic 
Submarine Contact Mines (1907)14 
Hague Convention (IX) Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in 
Time of War (1907)15 
Hague Convention (X) for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the 
Principles of the Geneva Convention (1907)16 
Hague Convention (XI) Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard 
to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War (1907)17 
Process-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare (London, 
1936)18 
Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea 
(1949)19 
The listed treaties to which the United States is a state party remain in 
effect and are a part of the supreme law of the land under Article VI of the 
Constitution. The others, Hague Conventions VI and VII and the Declaration 
of Paris, are important also because they contain some binding principles of 
the customary law of naval warfare. In spite of the title of Hague Convention 
IV, concerning land warfare, it states basic principles equally applicable to 
naval targeting. For example, it prohibits the employment of "arms, 
projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering. "20 Because 
of changes in the technology of naval warfare, some of the treaties are less 
applicable to contemporary naval targeting than when they were written. 
II. The Law Prior to the World Wars 
In the historic era when privateering and piracy were widespread, 
merchant ships were armed for defensive purposes. After the substantial 
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abandonment of privateering and the near elimination of piracy, it became 
unusual for a merchant ship to be armed. Following the development of 
armored warships in the U.S. Civil War, such ships became further specialized 
in offensive and defensive capabilities and were consequently very different 
from merchant ships. The military weakness of the merchant ship entitled 
it to special protection and the customary principle that it could not be 
lawfully attacked without warning was adopted.21 The procedures of visit 
and search by warships were used in naval warfare to enable boarding officers 
to determine the existence of probable grounds for capture and adjudication 
in prize. The intrinsic value of merchant ships made their capture rather than 
their destruction advantageous to the capturing state. The determination of 
whether or not a capture was lawful under the then criteria of international 
law was made by prize ~ourts. These courts were domestic courts which 
applied the widely agreed upon international law criteria.22 The effective 
enforcement method which ensured a high degree of uniformity in the 
decisions of diverse national courts was mutuality and reciprocity. Thejudges 
of each national prize court recognized that the standards it applied to enemy 
merchant ships and neutral ships charged with violating the law would be 
the same standards which foreign prize courts would apply to its merchant 
ships.23 Elaborate rules concerning enemy and neutral ships and the cargoes 
they carried were developed in the customary law. The Declaration of Paris 
(1856),24 the first multilateral treaty on the law of naval warfare covered 
privateering and blockades as well as the basic rules of naval economic 
warfare. It provided: 
1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished; 
2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war; 
3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture 
under enemy's flag; 
4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective: that is to say, maintained by 
a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy. 
The original state parties to the Declaration of Paris were the major European 
naval powers of the time and Turkey.2!! The United States was not a party 
and regarded the prohibition of privateering as opposed to the interest of the 
minor naval powers including itself.26 At the beginning of the Civil War the 
United States attempted to become an adherent to the Declaration because 
of the threat presented by the Confederate privateers, but the Declaration 
was closed and it was too late for further accessions. Article 1 of the 
Declaration of Paris has long been technologically obsolete, whereas article 
4 has been universally accepted as customary law. Articles 2 and 3 no longer 
address contemporary realities and they have been swept away by the 
comprehensive economic warfare practices of each of the major belligerents 
in the two W orId Wars. 
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III. The Development of the Law of 
Naval Targeting During the World Wars 
A. Beginning of Submarine Warfare: World War I. In 1914 the potential of 
the submarine warship as an efficient combatant unit, and in particular its 
ability to conduct economic warfare against enemy merchant ships, was not 
understood. It was assumed that submarines, like surface warships, would 
follow the time-honored procedures of visit and search.27 Great Britain, as 
the predominant surface naval power, instituted the long-distance blockade 
and the use of the navicert system with the objective that merchant ships 
including neutral ones would not be able to assist the enemy war effort. 
During the First World War the traditional doctrine that enemy merchant 
ships may not be the object of direct attack was eroded because of the 
integration of such merchant ships into the naval forces of the enemy. In 
addition, the integration of some neutral ships into the war effort of the enemy 
required that a distinction be made between them and neutral ships 
participating in genuine inter-neutral trade. Those neutral ships which were 
participating in the Allied naval war effort were functionally no different 
from participating belligerent merchant ships and, therefore, contrary to the 
traditional doctrine, would appear logically to be lawful objects of attack. 
The arming of British merchant ships, even though it was stated to be for 
"defensive purposes" only, made it impractical for submarines to use the 
traditional visit and search techniques. In the nineteenth century merchant 
ships were privately owned and their voyages and cargoes were privately 
controlled. During the World Wars private ownership existed nominally, but 
the effective control was in the governments and it was exercised with the 
single objective of advancing the war effort.28 A further consideration which 
made visit and search impossible was the employment of the British Q-ships, 
which appeared to be innocent merchantmen but were actually heavily armed 
warships employed to lure submarines to the surface and destroy them.29 In 
addition, the adoption of the convoy system by Great Britain and the United 
States in 1917 integrated merchant ships into belligerent naval operations with 
the result that they became functional warships.30 
Enemy warships remained lawful objects of attack without warning in the 
World Wars as they have always been historically. Because of the functional 
equivalency of participating merchant ships with warships, it would appear 
to be logically required that they also be lawful objects of attack without 
warning. This view was advanced by Germany as the preeminent submarine 
naval power. In the German view the proclamation of large submarine 
operational areas in the Atlantic Ocean where "unrestricted submarine 
warfare" was conducted provided adequate notice to neutrals to keep their 
merchant ships out of the proscribed area.31 In a functional sense, Germany 
was conducting the same comprehensive methods of economic warfare which 
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were utilized by the Allied naval powers except that the German technique 
was enforced by 'submarines rather than by surface warships. There is no 
reason to believe that gunfire by surface warships, the ultimate sanction of 
the long-distance blockade, was more humanitarian than torpedoes fired by 
submarines. 
The views just summarized, however logical, were decisively rejected by 
Great Britain and the United Stated which claimed that the traditional 
procedures of visit and search were still required of submarines.32 The only 
possible exception, in the view of the Allied naval powers, would be armed 
enemy merchant ships sailing in convoys escorted by warships. International 
conferences between the World Wars provided the opportunity for them to 
advance their claims in international law. 
B. Legal Developments Between the World Wars. During the Washington 
Naval Conference (1921-1922) Great Britain proposed the abolition of the 
submarine and Lord Lee made clear at the outset that in doing so "the British 
Empire had no unworthy or selfish motives. "33 He continued in reference 
to the submarine: 
It was a weapon of murder and piracy, involving the drowning of noncombatants. It 
had been used to sink passenger ships, cargo ships, and even hospital ships. TechnicaIly 
the submarine was so constructed that it could not be utilized to rescue even women 
and children from sinking ships and that was why he hoped that the conference would 
not give it a new lease of life.34 
The French, Italian, Japanese, and United States delegations joined with the 
British in deploring the claimed inhumane and illegal use of submarines by 
Germany in the World War but favored their retention.35 Secretary of State 
Charles Evans Hughes, the chairman of the conference, read into the record 
the full report on submarines which was prepared by the Advisory Committee 
of the United States delegation. It contained the following: 
The United States would never desire its Navy to undertake unlimited submarine 
warfare. In fact, the spirit of fair play of the people would bring about the downfaIl 
of the administration which attempted to sanction its use.36 
Senator Elihu Root, a former secretary of state, proposed, in Article I of 
the draft treaty concerning submarines, certain rules of naval warfare, which 
were stated to be "an established part of international law." These rules 
required visit and search of merchant vessels by submarines as well as by 
surface warships. Article I further provided: 
Belligerent submarines are not under any circumstances exempt from the universal rules 
above stated; and if a submarine cannot capture a merchant vessel in conformity with 
these rules the existing law of nations requires it to desist from attack and from capture 
and to permit the merchant vessel to proceed unmolested.37 
Article III stated the necessity for enforcement of the above rules and provided 
that: 
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any person in the service of any Power who shall violate any of these rules, whether 
or not such person is under orders of a government superior, shall be deemed to have 
violated the laws of war and shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an act of 
piracy .... 38 
The quoted provisions never became effective in spite of the support of the 
other participants in the Washington Conference because initially France, and 
then the others, refused to ratify the draft treaty. 
Article 22 of the London Naval Treaty of 193039 contained rules applicable 
to both surface and submarine warships. This 1930 treaty was terminated in 
1936 except for article 22 which was continued in effect as the Proces-Verbal 
Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare (1936) "without limitation of 
time." It provides: 
The following are accepted as established rules of International Law: 
(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the rules 
of International Law to which surface vessels are subject. 
(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned, 
or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, 
may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first 
placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of safety. For this purpose the ship's 
boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew 
is assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the 
presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board.40 
The interpretation and application of these binding rules of law were left 
to the Second World War and its aftermath. The principal ambiguities 
concerning naval targeting which appear in the text are the meanings of the 
terms "merchant ships," and "a merchant vessel." 
C. Continuation of Submarine Warfare: World War H. Writing at the 
beginning of the Second World War, Professor H. A. Smith pointed out the 
dramatic difference between trading practices at the time of the Declaration 
of Paris in 1856 and those in 1939: 
If we are again confronted with the facts for which the Declaration laid down the law, 
then that law must be applied to those facts. That is to say, if we can discover a genuine 
enemy private merchant carrying on his own trade in his own way for his own profit, 
then we must admit that his non-contraband goods carried in neutral ships are immune 
from capture at sea. Under the conditions of the modem socialistic world, such a person 
is not easily to be found .... Today he has become a disciplined individual mobilized 
in the vast military organization of the totalitarian State.41 
At the beginning of the Second World War, the naval belligerents on both 
sides continued the practices which had been started in the First World War 
and made every effort to improve upon them. Great Britain had such complete 
control of the surface of the oceans that it was able to force neutral merchant 
shipping to participate in the Allied war effort. Ms. Behrens, writing in the 
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official British history of the Merchant Navy, described the intensification 
of the system in 1940: 
In the summer of 1940, the ship warrant scheme was launched, both to further the 
purposes of economic warfare and in order to force neutral ships into British service 
or into trades elsewhere that were held to be essential. No ship, it was ordained ... was 
to be allowed any facilities in any port of the British Commonwealth unless the British 
had furnished her with a warrant.42 
During the Second World War the United States, first as a neutral and 
then as a belligerent, cooperated fully with the British methods.43 As a matter 
of theory neutral states did not have to cooperate with the Allied naval 
powers, but they realized that failure to cooperate would result in the 
application of much more stringent economic warfare measures against them. 
The result of this integration of neutral merchant ships into the Allied war 
effort is that they became lawful objects of attack like similarly employed 
belligerent merchant ships.44 Only those few neutral merchant ships engaged 
in genuine inter-neutral trade were immune from attack. 
The British Defense of Merchant Shipping Handbook (1938) was distributed to 
the masters of the Merchant Navy ships in 1938. On the subject of "conditions 
under which fire may be opened" the Handbook stated that if the enemy adopts 
a policy of sinking merchant ships without warning 
it will then be permissible to open fire on an enemy surface vessel, submarine or aircraft, 
even before she has attacked or demanded surrender, if to do so will tend to prevent 
her gaining a favourable position for attacking.45 
Subsequent instructions stated that the enemy had adopted such a policy of 
sinking without warning. 
At the outset of the Second World War, the German Navy incorporated 
the Proces-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare, also known as 
the Protocol of 1936, into the German Prize Code which was distributed to 
submarine commanders.46 By October 17, 1939 Germany issued the order to 
attack all enemy merchant ships without warning.47 Thus, early in the conflict, 
merchant ships and submarines of the opposing belligerents were attacking 
one another without warning. Germany followed its operational area 
declarations of the First World War by providing that vast areas of the North 
Atlantic Ocean were a submarine operational zone in which Germany could 
assume no responsibility for either damage to ships or injury to personne1.48 
On December 7, 1941, immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor, 
the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations sent a secret message to the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet which stated: 
EXECUTE AGAINST JAPAN UNRESTRICTED AIR AND SUBMARINE 
WARFARE.49 
Even though the "unrestricted" warfare was directed against Japan, it could 
nevertheless present a possible danger to neutral shipping in the vast Pacific 
s.v. Mallison and W.T. Mallison 249 
Ocean areas. Because the message was secret, it could not have provided 
notification to neutral states. However, the almost complete absence of 
neutral shipping in the Pacific made this problem more theoretical than real. 
The only shipping which Japan treated as neutral consisted of Russian ships 
sailing across the North Pacific between Siberian ports and Canadian and 
United States ports in the Pacific Northwest. While the Soviet Union was 
a belligerent in the European War, it remained technically neutral in the 
Pacific War until a few days before the Japanese surrender. 
Throughout the Pacific War,the merchant ships of both the United States 
and Japan were fully integrated into the naval war effort. As a practical 
matter, such ships were indistinguishable from formally commissioned naval 
auxiliary warships,so and such merchant ships, like warships, were lawfully 
subject to attack without warning. The United States reversed its prior 
position and, along with Japan, and the other naval belligerents in the Pacific 
War, it recognized that such merchant ships were functional warships and 
were subject to the same rules of international law. 
There are inconsistent analyses concerning the interpretation of the 
Protocol of1936 as applied to the events of the Second World War. Professor 
Robert Tucker, writing in a Naval War College "Blue Book," has stated 
concerning the Atlantic War: 
Despite this reaffirmation of the traditional law in the 1936 London Protocol, the record 
ofbeIligerent measures with respect to enemy merchant vessels during World War II 
fell far below the standards set in the preceding conflict. In the Atlantic Germany 
resorted to unrestricted submarine and aerial warfare against British merchant vessels 
almost from the very start of hostilities .... 51 
In the final stages of the conflict, the measures taken by Great Britain against enemy 
shipping wherever encountered were only barely distinguishable from a policy of 
unrestricted submarine warfare.52 
Professor Tucker has also commented on the legal situation in the Pacific 
War: 
In the Pacific War no attempt was made by either of the major naval belligerents to 
observe the obligations laid down by the 1936 London Protocol. Immediately upon the 
outbreak of war the United States initiated a policy of unrestricted aerial and submarine 
warfare against Japanese merchant vessels, and consistently pursued this policy 
throughout the course of hostilities. Japan, in turn, furnished no evidence of a willingness 
to abide by the provisions of the Protocol. ... 53 
Another "Blue Book" contains a different analysis of this subject: 
Professor Tucker has apparently assumed that the Protocol is designed to protect 
merchant vessels which are participating in the naval war effort. This does not take 
adequate account of the close relationship between the performance of combatant 
functions and the ensuing liability to attack without warning. In addition, it is 
inconsistent with the legislative history concerning the interpretation of "merchant 
vessel" as used in the Protocol.54 
The ambiguity concerning the terms "merchant ships" and "a merchant 
vessel" used in article 22 of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 and in the 
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identically worded Protocol of 1936 is considerably clarified by the Report 
of the Committee of Jurists of April 3, 1930 written by the lawyers who 
drafted the text. 
The Committee wish to place it on record that the expression "merchant vessel," where 
it is employed in the Declaration, is not to be understood as including a merchant vessel 
which is at the moment participating in hostilities in such a manner as to cause her 
to lose her right to the immunities of a merchant vessel.SS 
This stated criterion is more realistic than a test which attempts to 
distinguish between armed and unarmed merchant vessels. It is probably more 
important for the efficient conduct of anti-submarine warfare in particular 
contexts to have merchant ships make radio reports of submarine contacts 
than to have such ships armed. In addition, the great unarmed British 
passenger liners Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth each had the capability of 
transporting an entire infantry division and its equipment at a high sustained 
speed without naval escort and consequently provided a significant 
contribution to the Allied naval war effort. Because of their effective 
participation, it cannot be doubted that they were lawful objects of attack. 
Although the 1936 Protocol is sometimes referred to as the "Submarine 
Protocol," its second paragraph refers to "a warship, whether surface vessel 
or submarine." Consequently, the identical legal regime concerning attacks 
on merchant ships applies to both surface and submarine warships. Gunfire 
from surface warships is the ultimate sanction of the long-distance blockade 
employed by the Allied naval powers in both world wars. A surface warship 
may lawfully attack a belligerent or neutral vessel which is attempting to 
breach the blockade or resist visit and search. 
One of the factors considered in treaty interpretation is the working 
interpretation given to the treaty by the state-parties.56 The original state-
parties to the 1936 Protocol included the great naval powers of the time: Great 
Britain, United States, Japan, France, and Italy.57 Germany became a state-
party shortly thereafter.58 The working interpretation given to the Protocol 
by all six of these state-parties which were naval belligerents in the Second 
World War was that belligerent and neutral merchant ships participating in 
the naval war effort were not entitled "to the immunities of a merchant 
vessel" to use the wording employed by the Committee of Jurists who drafted 
the text. Therefore, the Protocol of 1936 is accurately interpreted as applying 
only to merchant ships which were not part of the war effort of the naval 
belligerents. In the Second World War there were but few merchant ship~ 
entitled to this protection. This legal situation is not a drastic departure from 
the traditional law which was applied prior to the World Wars. In that pre-
existing law the immunity of a merchant ship was also conditioned upon its 
not participating in any way in the naval hostilities. The long-established 
principle of customary law that a unit or ship may not exercise belligerent 
functions without simultaneously becoming a lawful object of attack remains 
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valid. There is no evidence to show that the Protocol of 1936 was designed 
to change this. 
A conclusion written several years ago appears to be equally applicable 
now: 
In summary. the juridical criteria to determine whether or not a merchant vessel is 
participating in the war or hostilities in a way which results in losing "the immunities 
of a merchant vessel" should be determined by the fact of such participation and not 
by the particular method of participation.59 
The most important category of ships immune from attack is hospital ships. 
Customary law was first codified in the 1899 Hague Convention (III) for the 
Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention 
of 22 August 1864,60 which adapted the principles of the law of land warfare 
for the protection of wounded in armies in the field, to the maritime 
environment. Hague Convention (X) (1907)61 revised and enlarged the 1899 
Hague Convention. It was applicable in both world wars. The first Geneva 
Convention (1864)62 for the protection of war victims comprised only ten 
articles and was limited to the protection of wounded personnel of armies 
in the field and to attending hospital and ambulance personnel.63 The 1907 
Hague Convention prescribed the legal regime for hospital ships in more detail 
than did the Hague Convention of 1899, specifying the external distinctive 
markings of hospital ships and requiring such ships to provide medical 
assistance to the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked personnel of the belligerents 
without distinction of nationality. Military interests were protected by the 
requirement that hospital ships must not be used for any military purpose. 
As a general rule, the immunity of hospital ships was respected in both World 
Wars with the exception of an incident in the First World War in which 
a German submarine sank a British hospital ship.64 
Cartel ships are also immunized from attack. The term "cartel" 
traditionally referred to an agreement between enemy belligerents 
concerning the exchange of prisoners of war. It is now used to refer to any 
non-hostile interaction of the belligerents governed by special agreement. In 
1945 the Japanese merchant ship Awa Maru undertook a voyage for a 
prescribed purpose and upon a specified route agreed to by the United States 
and Japan.65 The principal purpose was to carry relief supplies furnished by 
the United States to United States and Allied nationals held in Japanese 
custody upon the Asian mainland. On the return voyage to Japan, the ship 
was sunk without warning by a U.S. submarine. The commanding officer 
of the submarine, who had not seen the message immunizing the vessel, was 
subsequently relieved of his command and convicted by court martial of 
negligence in carrying out orders.66 In the ensuing diplomatic interchange, 
the United States apologized and offered to provide Japan with a vessel of 
similar size and characteristics to replace the Awa Maru.67 
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The u.s. Supreme Court held in The Paquete Habana,6S a decision arising 
from the Spanish-American War, that coastal fishing boats were not liable 
to capture and condemnation in prize. The ruling in this case is codified in 
Hague Convention No. XI (1907),69 which provides that vessels "used 
exclusively for fishing along the coast or small boats employed in local trade 
are exempt from capture." The Convention further provides that they cease 
to be exempt whenever they take part in hostilities. 
IV. The Application of the Law of Naval Targeting to War Crimes; 
and Post Second World War Humanitarian Law Treaties 
A. War Crimes Trials 
1. The Trial of Admiral Doenitz 
The only war crimes trials conducted by international tribunals were those 
before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo. The International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg conducted the trial of the principal leaders 
of the former German Government who were accused of war crimes or crimes 
against humanity. The case in which the Tribunal directly addressed the law 
of naval warfare was that of Admiral Doenitz, who initially commanded the 
German submarine force and was subsequently commander-in-chief of the 
navy. Admiral Doenitz was charged with planning aggressive war (count 
one), conducting aggressive war (count two), and with war crimes (count 
three) by "waging unrestricted submarine warfare contrary to the Naval 
Protocol of1936. "70 Sir Hartley Shawcross, the chief British prosecutor, stated 
to the Tribunal: 
Nor need we take time to examine the astonishing proposition that the sinking of neutral 
shipping was legalized by the process of making a paper order excluding such neutral 
ships not from some definite war zone over which Germany exercised control but from 
vast areas of the seas.71 
The judgment of the Tribunal, after stating that it "is not prepared to hold 
Doenitz guilty for his conduct of submarine warfare against British armed 
merchant ships," continued: 
However, the proclamation of operational zones and the sinking of neutral merchant 
vessels which enter those zones presents a different question. This practice was employed 
in the war of 1914-1918 by Germany and adopted in retaliation by Great Britain. The 
Washington Conference of 1922, the London Naval Agreement of 1930, and the Protocol 
of 1936 were entered into with full knowledge that such zones had been employed in 
the First World War. Yet the Protocol made no exception for operational zones. The 
order of Doenitz to sink neutral ships without warning when found within these zones 
was, therefore, in the opinion of the Tribunal, a violation of the Protocol.72 
The unreasonable and unworkable result of the holding here is that the 
Tribunal accepts the legality of German operational or exclusion zones as 
applied to belligerent merchant vessels but regards the same zones as unlawful 
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when applied to neutral merchant vessels. In doing this, the Tribunal ignored 
the fact that in the Second World War .many neutral merchant vessels were 
sailing in the same convoys with belligerent merchant vessels and the two 
were functionally indistinguishable from one another. 
The term "neutral merchant vessels" used by the Tribunal is more precise 
, than the wording concerning merchant vessels in the Protocol, but it remains 
ambiguous and comprises at least two distinct categories: those engaged in 
genuine inter-neutral trade which does not contribute to the economic 
warfare resources of a belligerent, and those neutral vessels which through 
acquiescence or ::oercion, participate in the naval war effort of a belligerent. 
The factual re;llity was that there were no immune neutral vessels in the 
.{\.tlantic O~.!an proscribed areas. The Tribunal's invocation of the 
normatively'.imbiguous term, "neutral merchant vessels," enabled it to avoid 
facing the facts concerning the integration of neutral shipping into the Allied 
naval war effort. The Tribunal applied the Protocol to Admiral Doenitz as 
if it were a criminal statute. He was found innocent on count one (planning 
aggressive war), guilty on count two (conducting aggressive war), and guilty 
on count three (war crimes). However, the ten year sentence imposed upon 
Doenitz was claimed not to be based upon count three because the United 
States also conducted "unrestricted submarine warfare" in the Pacific.13 The 
result of this is that the sentence was based only on count two, according 
to the Tribunal, which involved nothing more than Doenitz carrying out his 
regularly assigned duties as a line officer. 
The principal criticism concerning the Doenitz Case, however, is properly 
directed at Sir Hartley Shawcross and the other British prosecution lawyers. 
They either knew, or should have known, in the exercise of at least minimum 
standards of professional responsibility, the factual reality of the integration 
of almost all neutral shipping into the Allied naval war effort.74 As it was, 
they permitted the Tribunal to make a determination of guilt based on an 
erroneous factual assumption even though the Tribunal stated that the 
sentence was not based on this count. 
2. Other War Crimes Trials 
The war crimes trials other than the major trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo 
took place before national military tribunals which applied the international 
law of armed conflict. Captain Roskill, the official British historian of the 
naval war 1939-1945, has written: 
It is fair to mention there that, with one conspicuous exception, the captains of the 
German disguised raiders conducted their opera,tions, which were a perfectly legitimate 
form of warfare, with due regard to intemationallaw.75 
The exception referred to by Captain Roskill was the commander of a surface 
raider charged in the Trial of Von RuchteschelP6 before a British military tribunal 
with failure to give quarter during an attack on a British merchant ship. The 
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facts involved a daylight attack against the ship in which its wireless aerial 
was destroyed with the raider's first'salvo. The raider maintained heavy fire 
and signaled that the ship attacked was not to use its radio. The case report 
states: "The captain of the Davisian stopped his engines, hoisted an answering 
pennant and acknowledged the signal." The raider's gunfire continued, 
however, for another fifteen minutes and wounded several crew members 
while they were trying to abandon ship. Captain Von Ruchteschell was 
convicted on the apparent basis that the ship attacked had given an 
unequivocal indication of surrender. After this manifestation of surrender, 
the Davisian was no longer a lawful object of attack. 
In addition to the trial of Admiral Doenitz before the International Miliary 
Tribunal at Nuremberg, there were two other cases involving the "Laconia 
order" which was issued by Admiral Doenitz on September 17.1942 while 
he was serving as commander of the German submarine force. Tills order 
provided: 
(1) No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members of ships sunk, and this 
includes picking up persons in the water and putting them in life boats, righting capsized 
lifeboats and handing over food and water. Rescue runs counter to the rudimentary 
demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews. 
(2) Orders for bringing in captains and chief engineers still apply. 
(3) Rescue the shipwrecked only if their statements would be of importance for your 
boat. 
(4) Be harsh, having in mind that the enemy has no regard for women and children 
in his bombing attacks on German cities.77 
The Laconia order immediately followed Admiral Doenitz' attempt to 
establish a rescue zone of immunity during the period September 12-16,1942, 
Captain Roskill has described the facts: 
In September 1942, a group of [four] U-boats and a "milch cow" (as the Germans called 
their supply submarines) arrived south of the equator, and there on the 12th U.156 sank 
the homeward-bound troop ship Laconia, which had 1,800 Italian prisoners on board. 
On learning from survivors what he had done, Hartenstein, the U-boat's captain, sent 
a series of messages en clair calling for help in the rescue work and promising immunity 
to ships sent to the scene, provided that he himself was not attacked.78 
Admiral Doenitz ordered other U-boats to the rescue and the Vichy French 
Government was asked to send help from Dakar. The U-boats then took the 
principal role in the rescue operations which included towing lifeboats toward 
the African coast. This, of course, diverted the submarines from their regular 
wartime missions. Captain Roskill's account continues: 
All went well until the next afternoon [September 16] when an American Army aircraft 
from the newly established base on Ascension Island arrived, flew around the surfaced 
U-boats for about an hour, and then attacked U.156 with bombs. It is as impossible 
to justify that act as it is difficult to explain why it was committed.79 
s.v. Mallison and W.T. Mallison 255 
In 1960 the Historical Division of the u.s. Air Force stated concerning this 
incident: 
A summary of operations from Ascension Island states that on the morning of 16 
September 1942, a B-24 of the u.S. Army Air Forces sighted a submarine at 5 degrees 
South, 11 degrees 40 minutes West. The sub, which was towing two lifeboats and was 
in the process of picking up two more, was displaying a white flag with a red cross. 
The sub did not show any national flag when challenged by the B-24. The plane left 
the scene and contacted Ascension. Since no friendly subs were known to be in the area, 
the plane was instructed to attack.SO 
The person who issued the order to attack and the aircraft commander who 
carried it out are both prima facie guilty of a war crime. The conduct of the 
aircraft commander appears to be entirely inexcusable since he must have 
observed the rescue operation. During the time that they are engaged in such 
an operation, enemy submarines are no longer lawful objects of attack. The 
fact that the u.s. Army Air Forces took no action to investigate this incident 
and that no trials took place under the then-effective domestic military code, 
the Articles of War, is a serious reflection on the entire chain of military 
command. The attempt by Doenitz and Hartenstein to establish a rescue zone 
of immunity would have been effective if it had not been for the bombing. 
As it was, many of the personnel of the Laconia, including Italian prisoners 
of war and British civilian passengers, were rescued in an attempt which 
exemplifies the highest humanitarian traditions. The rescue attempt was 
entirely consistent with the central objective of the law of armed conflict 
to avoid unnecessary destruction of human values. Admiral Doenitz was 
charged with violating the rescue provisions of the Protocol of 1936 by issuing 
the order. There is, unfortunately, no evidence that the International Military 
Tribunal gave appropriate consideration to the rescue zone of immunity as 
the indispensable context in which the Laconia order was issued. The Tribunal 
did not find him guilty on this charge but it stated that the ambiguous terms 
of the order deserved the "strongest censure. "81 
The second case, the Trial of MoehleB2 before a British military tribunal, 
involved a German U-boat flotilla commander who was charged with a war 
crime in reading the Laconia order to captains of U-boats in his flotilla and 
of resolving the ambiguity in the order by providing examples in which the 
killing of survivors was approved. In convicting the defendant, the Tribunal 
accepted the contention of the prosecution that the examples used amounted 
to an order to kill. 
Although the third case, the Trial of Eck ("The Peleus Trial")83 is widely 
regarded as an implementation of the Laconia order, it is significant that the 
defense in it did not invoke the order as a superior order which mandated 
the killing of survivors. In this case, also before a British military tribunal, 
the captain, two officers, and a rating of the German submarine U-8S2 were 
charged with: 
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Committing a war crime in that you in the Atlantic Ocean on the night of13-14th March 
1944, when Captain and members of the crew ofUnterseeboot 852 which had sunk the 
steamship PeTeus in violation of the laws and usages of war were concerned in the killing 
of members of the crew of the said steamship, Allied nationals, by firing and throwing 
grenades at them.84 
The prosecution resolved the ambiguity in the charge by stating that the 
defendants were not accused of sinking a merchant ship without warning, 
but of killing its survivors. The Peleus was of Greek registration and under 
charter to the British Ministry of War Transport. Following the sinking, the 
accused spent approximately five hours attacking the survivors and the 
floating wreckage with machine gun fire and hand grenades. All of the 
survivors except three were either killed or subsequently died of wounds. 
The three were rescued about a month later and recounted the grim events. 
The evidence indicated that the captain, Eck, ordered the shooting and that 
the others carried out his orders. The principal defense claim was that the 
actions were necessary to eliminate all traces of the sinking. An experienced 
U-boat commander, who was called on behalf of the defense, testified that 
the approved method of evading Allied anti-submarine attack following a 
sinking was to leave the scene at high speed. All of the accused were found 
guilty and Eck and the other two officers were condemned to death.85 
The Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East states: 
Inhumane, illegal warfare at sea was waged by the Japanese Navy in 1943 and 1944. 
Survivors of passengers and crews of torpedoed ships were murdered.56 
The commander of the Japanese First Submarine Force at Truk issued an order 
on March 20, 1943 which is translated and quoted by the Far East Tribunal: 
All submarines shall act together in order to concentrate their attacks against enemy 
convoys and shall totally destroy them. Do not stop with the sinking of enemy ships 
and cargoes; at the same time, you will carry out the complete destruction of the crews 
of the enemy's ships; if possible, seize part of the crew and endeavor to secure information 
about the enemy.51 
Several examples of the carrying out of this flagrantly unlawful order are 
referred to in the judgment of the Tribuna1.88 One which is described in detail 
involved the sinking of the United States flag Liberty-type merchant ship Jean 
Nicolet, which had an armament manned by a U.S. Navy armed guard, and 
the brutal murder of most of the survivors of the sinking.89 The Tribunal 
stated, inter alia, that the ship's boats were smashed by gunfire and that some 
of the crew members, with their hands tied behind their backs, had to run 
a gauntlet on the deck of the submarine before being forced into the water. 
The remainder of the crew were left on the deck of the submarine when 
it submerged. Twenty-two crew members who survived these grim events 
were rescued the nex.t day and provided the testimony upon which the 
Tribunal's findings of fact were based. 
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Although aircraft attacked merchant vessels engaged in a belligerent's war 
effort during the Second World War, no trials took place involving such 
attacks. If such trials had taken place, they should have been conducted under 
the same legal criteria which would be properly applied in the trials 
concerning surface and submarine warfare. 
B. Events Following the Battle of the Bismarck Sea 
Unfortunately, it was not only Germans and Japanese who murdered 
survivors of ships they had attacked and sunk. In March 1943 the Japanese 
attempted to move about 7,000 soldiers by ship from Rabaul, New Britain 
where their military situation was increasingly precarious, to reinforce the 
Japanese Army in Lae, New Guinea.90 This involved the transit of the 
Bismarck Sea by a convoy of eight transports escorted by eight destroyers. 
The U.S. Army Air Forces in the Pacific had had a poor record for 
accurately targeting small islands, much less targeting moving ships, up to 
this time. The new commander of the Fifth Air Force under General Douglas 
MacArthur, the Commander-in-Chief Southwest Pacific, was Lieutenant 
General George C. Kenney, who changed the situation by having his medium 
bombers practice low-level attacks so that this capacity was added to the 
existing capability of heavy bombers in high-level bombing. The result was 
apparent in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea where the B-25 bombers sank 
every transport in the convoy (except one sunk by high-level heavy bombers) 
and half of the destroyers. Once the ships were sunk, the U.S. Armed Forces 
followed practices, much criticized when the offenders were German or 
Japanese, of killing as many of the helpless survivors in the water as possible. 
Professor Samuel Eliot Morrison, the official historian of the U.S. Navy 
during the Second World War, provides the following account: 
Meanwhile planes and PTs went about the sickening business of killing survivors in 
boats, rafts or wreckage. Fighters mercilessly strafed anything on the surface. On 5 
March the two PTs which had sunk Oigawa Maru put out to rescue a downed pilot 
and came on an enemy submarine receiving survivors from three large landing craft. 
Torpedoes missed as the U-boat crash-dived. The PTs turned their guns on, and hurled 
depth charges at the three boats-which, with over a hundred men on board, sunk. 
It was a grisly task, but a military necessity since Japanese soldiers do not surrender 
and, within swimming distance of shore, they could not be allowed to land and join 
the Lae garrison. 
Japanese submarines and destroyers saved 2,734 men from the convoy, but over 3,000 
were missing.91 
It is difficult to accept Professor Morrison's facile statement that Japanese 
soldiers do not surrender and his conclusion that a legitimate military necessity 
was involved. Some members of the Japanese Armed Forces, including the 
highly motivated Kamikaze pilots who participated in the Philippine and 
Okinawa operations, did surrender. It is not credible that Japanese soldiers 
without weapons who, it is assumed, could have made it to the New Guinea 
258 Law of Naval Operations 
shore would have become a military asset to the Japanese Army there. The 
greater probability concerning a then-unknown future is that they would have 
become an additional burden upon the supply and medical resources of that 
army.92 Another historian, Professor Ronald H. Spector, has provided a 
substantially similar factual account of the events following the Battle of the 
Bismarck Sea but has indicated some skepticism concerning the claim of 
military necessity.93 
If the same legal standards applied to Germans and Japanese who killed 
helpless survivors are followed in evaluating the actions of the U.S. Army 
Air Forces and the U.S. Navy following the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, there 
is no way they can be described as other than flagrant violations of customary 
and treaty law. It is a serious reflection on the entire chain of command that 
there was no investigation and no charges were brought against those who 
issued the orders. Justice Robert H. Jackson, the chief United States prosecutor 
before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, stated the basic 
legal principle in 1945: 
If certain acts in violation of treaties are crimes, they are crimes whether the United 
States does them or whether Germany does them, and we are not prepared to lay down 
a rule of criminal conduct against others which we would not be willing to have invoked 
against us.94 
Hague Convention X for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the 
Principles of the Geneva Convention (1907), a treaty of the United States, 
provides in relevant part: 
After each engagement, the two belligerents, so far as military interests permit, shall take 
steps to look for the shipwrecked, sick and wounded, and to protect them, as well as the dead, 
against pillage and ill-treatment.95 
The limitation in the treaty concerning "military interests" refers to 
legitimate military interests which are recognized as including only lawful 
objects of attack and therefore prohibits attacks on helpless survivors. 
C. Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, 
Sick and Shipwrecked members of Armed Forces at Sea (1949) 
The four 1949 Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims96 were 
written in the shadow of the Second W orId War and were designed to prevent 
repetition of some practices associated with that conflict. Geneva Convention 
II sets forth more detail than Hague Convention X (1907) and in article 18 
(1) provides: 
After each engagement, Parties to the conflict shaIl without delay take all possible 
measures to search for and coIlect the shipwrecked, wounded and sick, to protect them 
against pillage and ill-treatment, to ensure their adequate care, and to search for the 
dead and prevent their being despoiled. 
The significance of this provision is that in addition to making "the 
shipwrecked, wounded and sick" unlawful objects of attack, it imposes 
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affirmative duties in terms of their protection and care on a non-
discriminatory basis. Articles 22-35 provide more effective immunization 
from attack for hospital ships while prohibiting their use "for any military 
purpose" or for any acts "harmful to the enemy." Such ships may not possess 
or use secret communication codes and must be appropriately marked and 
notified to the enemy belligerent so as to facilitate their identification as 
hospital ships. Articles 36-40 provide enhanced protection for medical 
personnel and for medical transports including aircraft. 
D. Geneva Protocol I Concerning International Armed Conflicts (1977) 
The Geneva Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law, which met for 
a period of several weeks in each of the four years from 1974 to 1977, produced 
Protocol I concerning international armed conflicts and Protocol II 
concerning internal armed conflicts. These Protocols deal with both the 
methods of armed conflict (known traditionally as "the Hague Law") and 
the protection of war victims (known traditionally as "the Geneva Law"). 
The Protocols are designed to supplement the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
by adding provisions which have become necessary as a result of more recent 
developments in the methods of armed conflict. 
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims ofInternational Armed Conflicts97 deals 
with both the methods of armed conflict and the protection of war victims 
in land combat situations, including those involving aircraft, as well as lawful 
objects of attack. Protocol I is a treaty in force with 86 state-parties currently, 
including several middle level military powers and allies of the United States.98 
This constitutes more than half of the states in the world community and 
accords the Protocol a significant status as law through the agreement of 
states. In addition, many of the provisions of the Protocol are codifications 
of customary law.99 The two major military powers which are state parties 
are the Peoples Republic of China and the Soviet Union. The. position of the 
Reagan Administration was that Protocol I, which the United States has 
signed, will not be submitted to the ratification process.too 
Articles 48-67 of the Protocol comprise a section which provides certain 
protections for the civilian population from the effects of hostilities including 
attack by aerial bombardment. Article 49(3) refers specifically to "sea 
warfare" and provides: 
The provisions of this Section apply to any land, air or sea warfare which may affect 
the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian objects on land. They further apply 
to all attacks from the sea or from the air against objectives on land but do not otherwise 
affect the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict at sea or in the air. 
Other provisions specify methods and objects of attack which are unlawful. 
Article 51(4) prohibits indiscriminate attacks and describes them as attacks 
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"of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects 
without distinction." Article 51(5) provides in full: 
Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate: 
(a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single 
military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located 
in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or 
civilian objects; and 
(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury 
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.1°
' 
Sub-section (b) above is a codification of long-standing customary law. 
Article 51(6) provides in comprehensive terms that attacks "against the 
civilian population or civilians by way of reprisals are prohibited," 
supplementing the prohibition on reprisals against protected civilian persons 
in Geneva Convention IV for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War.102 Article 54(1) of the Protocol states: "Starvation of civilians as a 
method of warfare is prohibited." This appears to prohibit the comprehensive 
economic blockades imposed by the major Allied naval powers in both World 
Wars because one of the principal effects of such blockades was the starvation 
of civilians. A question of fact arises as to what extent particular segments 
of the civilian population are incorporated into the war effort. 
Articles 21-31 concern medical transportation. Article 22 provides a more 
comprehensive protection for hospital ships and coastal rescue craft than that 
provided in Geneva Convention II. For example, this article extends the 
protections of Convention II beyond hospital ships provided by a party to 
the conflict to also include hospital ships provided by a neutral or other state 
which is not a party to the conflict or by an impartial international 
humanitarian organization. The most obvious example of the latter category 
is the International Committee of the Red Cross. Article 23 provides 
protection to medical ships and craft whether they are located "at sea or in 
other waters," thereby covering territorial waters and internal waters such 
as ports, lakes and rivers. 
V. The Application of the Law of Targeting to 
Selected Situations Since 1945 
A. The Korean Armed Conflict 
The naval aspects of the Korean conflict were characterized by the 
overwhelming superiority of the United Nations naval forces.103 The 
operational command at sea was exercised by the Commander of the U.S. 
Seventh Fleet and comprised ships and aircraft of the United States Navy, 
British Commonwealth navies, and several allied navies. The exercise of 
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complete control of the seas made it possible to conduct a close-in naval 
blockade of the Korean coasts which was similar to the blockades in use in 
the nineteenth century. The North Korean government had no significant 
naval forces and there was no evidence of successful attempts to breach the 
blockade. Operational plans provided for the use of visit and search of any 
enemy or neutral vessels which were encountered. The intercepted vessels 
consisted largely of North Korea deep-sea fishing vessels equipped with radio 
transmitters and receivers. There was evidence that a number of these vessels 
were employed to obtain intelligence concerning the location and disposition 
of warships under the United Nations Command. These vessels were captured 
and where appropriate, their crews were made prisoners of war. None of 
them was entitled to status as immunized objects under the holding in The 
Paquete Rabana104 concerning the immunity of small coastal fishing boats which 
were not involved in the enemy armed conflict effort. 
Fish was a main staple of the Korean diet, particularly for coastal villages, 
in both the north and the south. It was decided, nevertheless, that fish would 
be declared contraband and that the elimination of even coastal fishing would 
add to the enemy logistic problems and provide an inducement to turn civilians 
against the North Korean regime. Leaflets in the Korean language with the 
following text were made available to as many North Korean fishermen as 
could be reached in September 1950: 
The Communists brought this terrible war down upon you. You cannot fish from your 
boats until the Communists are killed or thrown out. The United Nations Forces are 
human and do not desire to harm innocent victims of the war, but if you try to fish 
again before the Communists are completely defeated, you must suffer the consequences. 
A legal blockade has been declared and is enforced by United Nations Forces.t05 
When fishing was attempted thereafter, coastal boats were confiscated, and 
in some instances destroyed, and the fishermen were returned to the beach. 
No evidence was produced which indicated that North Korean military forces 
suffered significant logistical harm as the result of the ban on fishing. In 
contrast, there is evidence that North Korean fishing villages were reduced 
to starvation. Apparently, some of the fishermen were so desperate that they 
were reduced to attempting to spear fish in shallow water .106 There is no doubt 
that this ban constituted a violation of the customary law immunizing coastal 
fishing boats enunciated in The Paquete Rabana and codified in Hague 
Convention XI Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise 
of the Right of Capture in Naval War (1907).107 
Shore bombardment and aerial bombing in support of United States and 
allied land forces were conducted in the same way that the U.S. Pacific Fleet 
operated during the Second World War .108 In any area where civilian persons 
and objects were present, every effort was made to confine the bombardment 
to military targets. An example concerning the bombardment at Inchon prior 
to and during the famous amphibious landing behind enemy lines which 
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changed the course of the conflict was provided by the orders of Commander, 
Seventh Fleet: 
Vice Admiral Struble's orders to the bombardment forces clearly specified that there 
should be no promiscuous firing at the city itself or at civilian installations. To achieve 
this, the entire objective area had been divided [in target area maps] into 60 sub-areas. 
Known military targets had been previously assigned, and those which offered the 
greatest potential hazard to our landing forces were circled in red. It had been agreed 
that any ship could fire into a red circle area with or without a "spot" [by observer 
aircraft]. In the uncircled areas, however, firing was permitted only if definite targets 
were found and an air spot was available. This differentiation between types of areas 
was adopted to reduce destruction of non-military targets to a minimum, to save the 
city ofInchon for occupation forces, and to avoid injury to civilian personne1.109 
There is substantial evidence that this same systematic distinction between 
civilians and civilian objects and military personnel and objects was made 
when the bombardment objectives were located in North Korea in proximity 
to civilians there. The result was that shore bombardment was conducted in 
substantial compliance with Hague Convention IX Concerning Bombard-
ment by Naval Forces (1907).110 
B. The Cuban Missile Crisis: Self-Defense and Targeting 
The issue of the lawfulness of naval targeting is usually considered apart 
from the issue of self-defense or aggression in situations of ongoing armed 
conflict. Where there is no ongoing armed conflict, it is necessary to comply 
with the international law of self-defense in order to provide authority for 
the use of naval targeting. There are three indispensable requirements to 
justify in law military measures involving naval targeting which are based 
upon a claim of self-defense.111 They are: (1) A good faith attempt to use 
peaceful procedures; (2) actual necessity (as opposed to a sham or pretense) 
in the context of either an existing armed aggression or a threat of armed 
aggression against the defending state which is both credible and imminent; 
and (3) proportionality in responding defensive measures. The elements of 
these requirements, which were developed over a long period of time in 
customary international law, are now codified in the United Nations Charter, 
a treaty of the United States. 
Article 2(3) of the Charter provides: 
All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner 
that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. 
Article 2(4) provides: 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. 
The complementary article 51 provides in relevant part: 
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Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defense if an armed attack occurs .... 
The "inherent right," which is the customary law, requires both actual 
necessity for and proportionality in responding defensive measures. The 
English language text of article 51 is neither well-drafted nor consistent with 
the negotiating history at the San Francisco Conference which reveals that 
reasonable and necessary anticipatory self-defense was retained and that self-
defense is not limited only to the situation of an "armed attack." The wording 
cannot be read as if it stated: "if, and only if, an armed attack occurs." The 
more carefully drafted and equally authentic French text of article 51 uses 
the term "aggression armee" which includes, but is not limited to, armed 
attack, and this is consistent with the negotiating history. The view of 
Committee I at San Francisco that article 2(4) does not impair the customary 
law of self-defense is set forth in the words of its rapporteur, "The use of 
arms in legitimate self-defense remains admitted and unimpaired. "112 The 
words "inherent right" in the English text refer to the preexisting customary 
law and, therefore, include anticipatory self-defense. Because the doctrines 
concerning anticipatory self-defense may be even more subject to abuse than 
the doctrines concerning an existing armed aggression, the three criteria are 
applied with greater stringency where anticipatory self-defense is claimed.ll3 
A preeminent example of the application of these principles is the famous 
Caroline incident of1837 which involved a river steamer of that name employed 
by u.S. nationals to aid the rebels in the then civil war in Canada.114 The 
British Government (then the sovereign in Canada) had attempted 
unsuccessfully to have the u.S. Government prevent assistance to the rebels. 
Thereafter, Canadian troops came into United States territory and destroyed 
the Caroline to prevent its imminent further use. The British Government 
claimed reasonable and necessary anticipatory self-defense. The diplomatic 
exchange is best known for Secretary of State Webster's formulation of the 
requirements of self-defense as involving a "necessity of that self-defense 
[which] is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment for deliberation. "115 This statement is too restrictive since a credible 
threat may be imminent without being "instant" and more than a "moment 
for deliberation" is required to make a lawful choice of means. The most 
important of Mr. Webster's words carefully specified the requirements of 
proportionality as follows: 
[N]othing unreasonable or excessive [is permitted], since the act justified by the necessity 
of self-defense, must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it.116 
The legal significance of the Caroline incident is that it illustrates compliance 
with the three requirements of international law. The British attempted to 
use peaceful procedures, were confronted with an imminent danger of attack, 
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and employed coercion in response which was strictly proportional, and the 
incident was resolved on this basis. 
On October 16, 1962 President Kennedy received the "first preliminary 
hard information" showing the establishment of missile bases with an 
offensive targeting capability in Cuba.ll7 Aerial surveillance of Cuba was 
increased and conclusive photographic evidence of the inter-continental 
capability of the emplacements was obtained in the next few days. On October 
18, 1962, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko visited the President and assured 
him that Soviet assistance to Cuba "pursued solely the purpose of contributing 
to the defense capabilities of Cuba." 
President Kennedy and his advisers met in a group that subsequently became 
known as the "Executive Committee." A wide range of responses, from so-
called "pin-point bombing" and invasion to doing nothing, was considered. 
Because there was no Soviet armed attack, lesser military responses were 
considered with full realization that if they were ineffective, more coercive 
uses of military power including naval targeting would be employed. 
In the decade of the 1950s, much emphasis was placed upon plans involving 
"massive retaliation" with nuclear weapons or, as it was put informally, "a 
bigger bang for a buck." In contrast, some naval officers and civilians at the 
Naval War College in Newport and in the Navy Department in Washington 
continued to manifest an interest in limited uses of naval power. Among them 
was Rear Admiral Robert D. Powers, USN, who in 1958 wrote an influential 
article in the Naval Institute Proceedings entitled "Blockade: For Winning 
Without Killing. "118 The article emphasized the potential uses in the nuclear 
age of a limited naval blockade with characteristics quite different from the 
comprehensive economic blockades conducted successfully by the Allied 
powers in two World Wars. In October 1962, when Admiral Powers was 
serving as the Deputy Judge Advocate General of the Navy, he wrote the 
initial draft of a proposal for a limited naval blockade of Cuba to interdict 
further missiles and components and to remove the existing ones. Following 
consultations with Rear Admiral Mott, the Navy JAG, Admiral Anderson, 
the Chief of Naval Operations, and General Maxwell Taylor, the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, some changes were made in the draft and General 
Taylor took it to the "Executive Committee" where it was considered along 
with other recommendations in formulating the President's proclamation of 
October 23 entitled "Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to 
Cuba. "119 In the text, as in the title, the term "blockade" was avoided so 
that there could be no confusion between the limited measures taken and the 
comprehensive economic blockades of the World Wars. The effectuation of 
the quarantine-interdiction, nevertheless, involved a limited naval blockade 
with offensive missiles having nuclear capability and inter-continental range 
classified as "prohibited material" which was functionally equivalent to 
contraband. 
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The President announced the measures to be taken in a radio and television 
address on October 22 which, in substance, made a claim of necessary and 
reasonable anticipatory national self-defense. On October 23 the prevailing 
opinion in the United Nations Security Council, which was initially skeptical 
about the factual claims made by the United States, changed drastically with 
the circulation by Ambassador Stevenson of copies of the aerial photographs 
showing the clandestinely established missile launching sites in Cuba. Also 
on October 23 the Organ of Consultation of the Organization of American 
States made the claim of anticipatory collective self-defense. Beginning on 
October 24, the ships carrying further offensive weapons to Cuba turned back 
rather than encounter the blockading naval forces. What had appeared at 
times to be a potential nuclear confrontation between the United States and 
the Soviet Union was resolved by the Kennedy-Kruschev Agreement which 
resulted in the removal of the existing missile emplacements.l20 
The United States' responding measures in the Cuban Missile Crisis met 
each of the legal requirements for anticipatory self-defense. In view of the 
misleading statements made to the President by Soviet Foreign Minister 
Gromyko. it was deemed that the requirement of attempted peaceful 
procedures had been met and that it was futile to attempt further 
communications on the subject at that time. The drastic change in the nuclear 
balance of forces which would have resulted from the emplacement of Soviet 
missiles with nuclear capability in Cuba constituted the most serious kind of 
imminent danger to the United States and the Western Hemisphere. The 
character of the danger required that action be taken before the missiles were 
armed and operational. If delay had taken place until the missiles could be 
fired or used as the basis for "nuclear blackmail," it would have been too 
late. For these reasons, the requirement of an actual and imminent danger 
was met. The limited naval blockade amounted to the least possible use of 
military force in response and easily met the requirement of proportionality. 
The operational planning for the limited naval blockade of Cuba included 
consideration of the lawful objects of naval targeting and the methods which 
should be employed against them. If the ships carrying further offensive 
weapons had not turned back on October 24, the contingency plans would 
have been acted on and the traditional procedures applicable to ships 
attempting to breach a blockade would have been used. The penultimate 
paragraph of the Presidential Proclamation provided: 
Any vessel or craft which may be proceeding toward Cuba may be intercepted and 
may be directed to identify itself. its cargo, equipment and stores, and its ports of call, 
to stop, to lie to, to submit to visit and search, or to proceed as directed. Any vessel 
or craft which fails or refuses to respond to or comply with directions shall be subject 
to being taken into custody.121 
The ultimate sanction was reserved for ships which refused to submit to 
visit and search or attempted to run the blockade. Such ships would have 
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become lawful objects of attack and after failure to respond to warning could 
be sunk by naval gunfire. The final paragraph of the Presidential Proclamation 
stated: 
In carrying out this order, force shall not be used except in case of failure or refusal 
to comply with directions, or with regulations or directives of the Secretary of Defense 
issued hereunder, after reasonable efforts have been made to communicate them to the 
vessel or craft, or in case of self-defense. In any case, force shall be used only to the 
extent necessary.l22 
The Cuban Missile Crisis, in addition to providing a modern model of the 
criteria for lawful anticipatory national and collective self-defense, illustrates 
the flexibility of naval force in achieving national objectives without the 
destruction of human or material values through its presence at the blockade 
line and without employing the full range of coercive measures which it 
possesses. The compliance with the international law criteria of self-defense 
provided legal authority for the use of the blockade and the necessary measures 
of naval coercion to enforce it. 
c. The Attack on the U.S.S. Liberty 
The 1967 attack on the Liberty has been summarized as follows: 
At 1403 on Thursday, 8 June 1967 the U.S. electronics intelligence ship Liberty (AGTR 
5) was steaming at a leisurely five knots, 14 miles offshore from the Egyptian town 
ofEI Arish on the Mediterranean coast of Sinai, when she was attacked by Israeli fighter-
bombers. The attack continued for seven minutes, leaving eight of the ship's crew dead 
or dying, more than 100 wounded, and the ship riddled and burning. 
Fourteen minutes later, the Liberty was attacked by three Israeli torpedo boats which 
raked the ship with gunfire-killing another four men-and then launched torpedoes. 
One torpedo hit a communications compartment, multiplying the Liberty's dead to a 
total of 34. Within 30 minutes of the torpedo attack, two helicopters carrying armed 
troops appeared alongside, and two jet fighters loitered in the sky astern as if poised 
for strikes. As suddenly as it had started, everything stopped. Israel said it was a 
"mistake. "123 
It should be added that the attacks took place on a sunny day in international 
waters following a long period of Israeli aerial surveillance of the vessel.124 
The Liberty's flag at the mainmast was clearly visible and its white hull 
identification markings as well as its physical appearance made it very 
different from any Egyptian warship or Egyptian flag merchant ship. 
Following the torpedo attack, life rafts were dropped over the side of the 
ship, secured by a heavy line so that they would be available readily in case 
the order to abandon ship had to be given. The torpedo boats attacked the 
life rafts with gunfire, sinking two and cutting the line on the third. The 
Israeli torpedo boats then sped away taking the third life raft with them. 
There are two inescapable conclusions which follow from the facts involved 
in the attack. First, the facts show that the attack was deliberate. The 
Government ofIsrael offered a number of unpersuasive excuses for the attack 
including that the ship was mistaken for the Egyptian naval coastal transport 
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El Quseir which was a ship half the size of the Liberty and of distinctly different 
appearance. The six hours of close-in aerial surveillance of the ship prior to 
the initial aerial attack combined with the ideal visual conditions rule out 
the possibility of a mistake.125 
The second necessary conclusion is that the law applicable to objects of 
attack was violated. The Liberty was a neutral ship sailing in international 
waters and it was apparent that it was not participating directly or indirectly 
in any belligerent state's naval war effort. As such, it was a ship lawfully 
immune from attack. In addition, the life rafts would have been illegal objects 
of attack in any circumstances. The attack on the life rafts, which was the 
last attack when the Liberty was afire and listing heavily, was a violation of 
the Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, 
Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of 1949.126 Whatever 
the Israeli motivation for the attack may have been, the conclusion of its 
illegality remains.127 
D. The Vietnam Armed Conflict 
One of the problems confronted by the government of the Republic of 
Vietnam (South Vietnam) in the course of the ongoing hostilities in 1965 was 
the infiltration by small craft of enemy weapons and supplies through its 
territorial and contiguous waters. Operation Market Time, a cooperative 
endeavor of the u.S. Navy and the South Vietnam Navy, was designed to 
provide surveillance and inspection to prevent such infiltration in the three-
mile territorial sea and in a nine-mile contiguous zone.128 The time-honored 
procedures of visit and search were employed. Gunfire from naval vessels 
was the ultimate sanction, but it was not employed unless visit and search 
was resisted.129 Because the operation was conducted within territorial waters 
where sovereign authority existed and within a reasonable contiguous zone, 
there was no conflict with international law. The measures employed were 
an aspect of the overall South Vietnamese claim to self-defense and the only 
objects of attack were lawful since they were limited to craft participating 
in the enemy war effort and resisting visit and search. 
By 1972 most of the United States Army and Marine Corps forces had been 
withdrawn from Vietnam. In late March and early April of that year, the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) launched a major attack 
across the "Demilitarized Zone" into South Vietnam. The U.S. Government 
responded with air attacks and a mining campaign directed against the port 
of Haiphong and other North Vietnamese ports.130 The great majority of 
weapons and other military supplies imported by North Vietnam arrived by 
sea, and about 40 cargo ships called at these ports each month. President Nixon 
announced the mining May 8, 1972. Thereafter, it was announced that the 
ports, including internal and territorial waters, would be mined commencing 
at 0900 Saigon time on May 9 and that the mines were set to activate 
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automatically at 1800 hours Saigon time on May 11. This was done to permit 
vessels then in North Vietnamese ports ample time to depart before the mines 
were activated. The mines were laid by aircraft from u.S. Navy carriers and 
the interdiction resulted in no foreign merchant ships being sunk. Even though 
the United States did not use the blockade terminology, the mining campaign 
complied with the historic criteria for a close-in blockade. The announcement 
of the mining was widely publicized so that neutrals were informed in 
advance. It was limited to North Vietnam and did not block access to neutral 
ports. The blockade appears to have been effective and easily met the criteria 
of the Declaration of Paris that a blockade "must be effective, that is to say 
maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the 
enemy. "131 In addition, the mines were passive weapons and no ship was made 
an object of attack unless it activated the mines by entering or leaving one 
of the North Vietnamese ports. In comparison with the aerial bombing 
campaign where military objects were attacked with the possibility of 
ancillary civilian destruction,132 the mining was a very restrained response 
to the North Vietnamese attack.133 For all of these reasons, the mining 
complied with both the historic and contemporary criteria of international 
law concerning objects of attack. 
The available evidence indicates that the U.S. Navy conducted shore 
bombardment of military objectives under the same limitations which were 
observed during the Korean conflict.134 The bombardment was sometimes 
conducted in support of United States and South Vietnamese ground force 
operations. The objects of attack were lawful for the same reasons that the 
objects of attack were lawful in the shore bombardments during the Korean 
conflict.135 
E. The Falklands/Malvinas Armed Conflict 
Following the Argentinian invasion and conquest of the Falklands/Malvinas 
Islands in early April 1982 (which was accomplished withQut bloodshed due 
to the Argentine avoidance of civilian casualties), Great Britain sent a naval 
task force to regain the islands.136 The task force was comprised of two small 
aircraft carriers with V/STOL (vertical short take off and landing) aircraft, 
five nuclear-powered attack submarines, eight guided missile destroyers, 
fifteen general purpose frigates, and a number of smaller combatant vessels 
including minesweepers and landing craft. The task force also contained 
several Royal Fleet Auxiliaries and a number of requisitioned commercial 
vessels including the liners Canberra and Queen Elizabeth II, used as troop 
transports, and the liner Uganda, used as a hospital ship. The entire task force, 
except for the Uganda which was not made an object of attack by Argentina,137 
consisted of vessels which were lawful objects of attack. Argentine Air Force 
and Navy aircraft inflicted substantial damage on ships of the task force and 
sank the destroyers Sheffield and Coventry, the frigates Antelope and Ardent, and 
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the landing craft Sir Galahad. l38 An aircraft-launched missile, apparently 
intended for one of the British aircraft carriers, sank the merchant ship Atlantic 
Conveyor which had participated in the naval war effort by carrying a cargo 
of helicopters and other military equipment. 
On May 1 the nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror shadowed an Argentine 
Navy task force consisting of the large light cruiser General Belgrano139 and 
two destroyers equipped with Exocet anti-ship missiles. The task force was 
operating south of a British exclusion zone of April 12 which covered a circle 
from the center of the islands with a 200 mile radius. On May 2 the Conqueror 
received permission from the British Cabinet to attack and it sank the Belgrano 
with two torpedoes, causing the death of more than 300 members of the 
crew.140 There can be no doubt but that- this was the sinking of a lawful object 
of attack. The British maritime exclusion zone was, however, interpreted 
by some as not extending to objects of attack outside of the zone.t41 The 
apparent outcome was a British naval victory followed by a substantial 
political defeat in world public opinion. After the sinking of the Belgrano, 
Argentine surface combatants remained within the Argentine territorial and 
internal waters. 
On June 6 the u.s. Maritime Administration informed both Great Britain 
and Argentina of a list of United States flag vessels and United States interest 
vessels (owned by U.S. nationals but flying a foreign flag of convenience) 
traversing the South Atlantic to ensure that these neutral vessels would not 
be attacked. The U.S. interest Liberian flag tanker Hercules was sailing from 
the East Coast of the United States to Alaska via Cape Horn.142 On June 8, 
when it was approximately 600 nautical miles off the Argentine coast and 
500 miles from the Falkland Islands, it was attacked by Argentine aircraft 
in three different strikes using bombs and air-to-surface rockets. It proceeded 
to Rio de Janeiro harbor and, following a survey by Brazilian Navy authorities 
who determined that the damage was extensive and that unexploded bombs 
could not be removed safely, it was taken out to deep water and sunk. As 
a neutral vessel not participating in the British naval effort, the Hercules was 
clearly not a lawful object of attack. Following the refusal of the Government 
of Argentina to pay compensation, the owner brought an unsuccessful suit 
against that country under the Federal Alien Tort Act in the United States.143 
F. The Iran-Iraq Armed Conflict 
The Iranian war effort was supported financially almost entirely by the 
export of its oil.l44 The "Tanker War" of 1980-1988 was carried on by Iraq 
exclusively through air attacks, and the targets of the substantial majority 
of Iraqi attacks were tankers transporting Iranian oil. Both Iran and Iraq 
proclaimed exclusion zones in which shipping was subject to attack. 
Approximately one half of the Iraqi attacks were within the Iraqi prescribed 
exclusion zones, and the other half were within the Iranian exclusion zone.145 
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The available information indicates that most of the Iraqi attacks were not 
preceded by visual identification of the target. Apparently Iraqi Air Force 
planes targeted radar location of ships on the ~ssumption that such 
identification of targets within one of the exclusion zones must be a tanker 
carrying Iranian oil or a tanker in ballast which was scheduled to take on 
Iranian oil. Because of the location of the targets in the exclusion zones and 
the usual absence of immune vessels from such zones, the Iraqi attacks cannot 
be appraised as indiscriminate even though carried out without visual 
identification. 
The lack of visual identification was a cause of the Iraqi accidental attack 
on the guided-missile frigate U.S.S. Stark (FFG-31) on May 17, 1987, in 
international waters outside of any of the exclusion zones.146 The air-to-
surface missiles struck the ship, killing 37 crew members and wounding a 
substantial number of others. Published reports indicate that the Stark 
personnel and equipment were not ready to defend the ship even though the 
attacking aircraft was identified before the missiles were fired. Efficient 
damage control procedures prevented the Stark from sinking. It is apparent 
that the Stark, as a neutral warship in international waters, was not a lawful 
object of attack and the Iraqi Government apologized, assumed full 
responsibility, and agreed to pay damages. 
The analysis of the lawfulness of the Iraqi air attacks is clearly applicable 
to the targeting of Iranian flag tankers. In addition, a general rule is that 
neutral ships acquire the character of an enemy merchant vessel when they 
are participating directly or indirectly in the enemy war effort.147 
Consequently, neutral flag tankers involved in the export ofIranian oil were 
equally lawful objects of attack by the Iraqi Air Force. Iran could not lawfully 
immunize its export of oil from attack by simply placing it on neutral ships. 
Early in the war, Iranian air attacks knocked out Iraqi oil terminals in the 
Gulf and effectively prevented access to Iraqi ports. Thereafter, Iraq exported 
its oil overland by pipeline and received some of its war sustaining material 
through Kuwaiti and Saudi ports.148 The six neutral states which comprised 
the Gulf Cooperation Council were increasingly concerned about the Iranian 
attacks on neutral shipping. In partial response to this concern, the United 
Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 552 on June 1, 1984. It reaffirmed 
"the right of free passage in international waters and sea lanes for shipping 
en route to and from all ports and installations of the littoral States that are 
not parties to the hostilities," condemned the Iranian attacks on "commercial 
ships en route to and from the ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia," demanded 
that such attacks" cease forthwith," and that there "be no interference with 
ships en route to and from States that are not parties to the hostilities. " This 
amounts to a clear statement of the right of neutral shipping to be free from 
attack in international waters. The Security Council took this position even 
though the facts showed that both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were providing 
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significant assistance to the Iraqi war effort by the overland transport of 
supplies and in other ways. The Council apparently was convinced that, on 
balance, the Gulf Cooperation Council states and their shipping retained 
neutral status. This decision seems to have been influenced by the fact that 
the neutral ships of the Gulf Cooperation Council states, including the 
Kuwaiti reflagged tankers, were not engaged in assisting the Iraqi war effort 
by carrying Iraqi oil. It should be added that Resolution 552 does not condemn 
the Iraqi attacks. 
Iran's air and surface attacks on shipping typically followed visual 
identification. The selected targets were indiscriminate in that they included 
unlawful attacks on ships engaged in genuine inter-neutral trade. Some of 
the targets selected were ships carrying Iraqi war-sustaining material to 
Kuwaiti or Saudi ports for overland transport to Iraq. While the attacks 
caused damage to ships and personnel, they did not usually bring about sinkings 
because of the lack of efficient anti-ship missiles.149 Although Iran had 
sufficient surface combatant ships to conduct visit and search, there is no 
evidence that it did so on a regular basis. Consequently, the contraband or 
immune character of particular cargoes was usually unknown to Iranian 
attackers. Iran claimed that its actions were in reprisal to the Iraqi attacks, 
but since these Iraqi attacks were lawful, there is no basis for the claim. The 
indiscriminate Iranian attacks must be appraised as unlawful. 
Iran also laid moored mines, many of which broke their cables, in the 
international waters of the Gulf. Unlike the mining of North Vietnamese 
ports, where the location of the mines in territorial and internal waters and 
the notice to neutral shipping resulted in no damage to neutral ships, the 
Iranian mining was not announced and was apparently directed at neutral 
shipping. ISO This unlawful activity was substantially curtailed following the 
United States helicopter attack and capture of the Iranian minelayer Iran Ajr 
on September 21, 1987.151 The minelaying was taking place about 50 miles 
northeast of Bahrain in an area used by ships before moving to oil-loading 
terminals. 
The U.S. Middle East Force which had previously consisted of only three 
to five ships was substantially augmented during 1987.152 In early 1987 the 
Government of Kuwait was increasingly concerned about Iranian attacks on 
tankers transporting Kuwaiti oil and it approached both the Soviet Union 
and the United States for assistance. Kuwait chartered three Soviet-flag long-
hull tankers.153 In May of the same year the Kuwaiti and United States 
Governments agreed that the United States would reflag eleven Kuwaiti 
tankers consistent with recognized international legal procedures. l54 The plans 
and procedures for U.S. Navy escort of these neutral tankers were agreed 
upon by the Middle East Force and the Kuwaiti Oil Tanker Company. In 
the initial convoy of reflagged tankers in July 1987, the lead tanker, the 401 ,382 
ton Bridgeton struck a mine. 155 It successfully completed the voyage at reduced 
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speed, although it was subsequently out of use for several months while the 
damage was repaired. Since the hull of the Bridgeton was substantially thicker 
than the hulls of the escorting warships, its master recommended that the 
escorts fall in astern of his ship, which they did. l56 The Bridgeton as a neutral 
tanker not participating in the war effort of either belligerent, was an 
unlawful object of attack. 
A number of small Iranian combatant vessels became lawful objects of 
attack by approaching the neutral vessels convoyed by the u.S. Navy in a 
hostile manner and were driven off or sunk by u.S. Navy vessels or 
helicopters. Meanwhile, because of the danger to other neutral shipping, 
including attacks by small Iranian combatant vessels using machine guns and 
rocket-propelled grenades, the British, French, Italian, Dutch and Belgian 
navies sent a number of small combatant vessels, including minesweepers, to 
the Gulf and escorted neutral vessels under their flags. l57 
On October 16, 1987, the U.S.-reflagged former Kuwaiti tanker Sea Isle 
City located about ten miles off Mina aI-Ahmadi was hit and damaged by 
a Silkworm missile fired by Iran from Fao Peninsula with the result of damage 
to the ship and injuries to personne1.158 Three days later the U.S.Navy shelled 
and blew up an Iranian oil platform east of Bahrain and destroyed the 
electronic equipment on a nearby platform. Prior to the shelling, the United 
States gave notice of the impending action so that personnel would have the 
opportunity to evacuate the platforms, and it was believed that they did so. 
This attack' on what was considered a lawful target was a limited and 
proportionate response to the attack on the Sea Island City. It should be added 
that there were no further attacks using Silkworm missiles on U.S. flagged 
vessels. 
G. The April 1986 Attack on Libya: Self-Defense and Targeting 
Authors' note: 
This section was written based on the best information the authors were able to obtain 
from the available unclassified sources. They have been reliably informed that there 
is also classified material which contributed to the decisions made and actions taken 
in the planning and carrying out of this attack. Neither of the authors has access to 
such information and such access would not be consistent with their independent 
professional work. The present analysis emphasizes the law applicable to targeting. 
The Reagan Administration claimed that the attacks on Benghazi and 
Tripoli on April 15, 1986 (April 14, Washington, D.C. time), were justified 
on the basis of self-defense. It is therefore necessary to apply the international 
law of self-defense (as in the analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis) and other 
possible legal grounds for the attack to the events. The law of targeting will 
then be applied to determine the compliance with its requirements by the 
U.S. Navy and Air Force in the attack. The factual background which will 
be examined initially is essential to an understanding of the law. 
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1. The Factual Background 
Attacks took place at the El Al Israel airline counters in the Rome and 
Vienna airports on December 27, 1985, resulting in 19 civilian casualties 
including five United States nationals, and among them, Natasha Simpson, 
an 11 year old girl.159 President Reagan commented on those grim events in 
the opening statement at his press conference on January 7, 1986: 
It's clear that the responsibility for these latest attacks lies squarely with the terrorist 
known as .Abu Nidal and his organization .... But these murderers could not carry 
out their crimes without the sanctuary and support provided by regimes such as Col. 
Qadhafi's in Libya. Qadhafi's longstanding involvement in terrorism is well-
documented, and there's irrefutable evidence of his role in these attacks .... By 
providing material support to terrorist groups which attack u.s. citizens, Libya has 
engaged in armed aggression against the United States under established principles of 
international law, just as ifhe [sic] had used its own armed forces.I60 
In response to a question at the press conference, the President stated, inter 
alia, "I can assure you that we have the evidence .... Abu Nidal has more 
or less moved his headquarters there into Libya. "161 The President issued an 
Executive Order on the same day, which stated: 
I, RONALD REAGAN, President of the United States of America, find that the policies 
and actions of the Government of Libya constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat 
to the national security and foreign policy of the United States and hereby declare a 
national emergency to deal with that threat ... .162 
Secretary of State Schultz' address to the National Defense University on 
January 15, 1986, considered recent episodes of terrorism under the title, 
"Low-Intensity Warfare: The Challenge of Ambiguity. "163 He recommended 
military responses to such "warfare" conducted against the United States 
while pointing out, "The law requires that such actions be necessary and 
proportionate. "164 Apparently the Libyan connection with the airport murders 
was that some of the perpetrators carried passports which had belonged to 
Tunisians who had worked in Libya.165 This information is equivocal and 
consequently mayor may not indicate Libyan support for these terrorist 
actions. Professor Richard E. Rubenstein, in his study of contemporary 
terrorism, states: 
In fact, no evidence demonstrating Libyan complicity in these attacks was ever produced. 
Calling this episode of terrorism "war" was primarily a frustrated response, signifying 
acceptance of the principle of collective responsibility: if we cannot find and punish 
the perpetrators, we will punish their suppliers and sympathizers .... Militarily, it 
reflects the questionable premise that drying up the terrorists' external sources of supply 
will terminate their activities. Morally, it is intended to justify retaliation in which 
innocent civilians get hurt. And politically. it ends the search for indigenous social causes 
of terrorism, preferring to view local violence as a product of policies formulated in 
some foreign capital.I66 
While it is very important to search for, identify and attempt to ameliorate 
or correct the "indigenous social causes of terrorism," the role of the suppliers 
of terrorism should not be overlooked. On February 8, 1988, The Washington 
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Post reported an interview with Qaddafi by Katherine Graham, chairman of 
The Washington Post Company, and correspondents of the Post and Newsweek 
under the headline, "Gadhafi: Terrorism is Response to U.S. Policies. "167 The 
article stated, inter alia: 
Asked about Libyan involvement in supplying weapons to groups that carry out 
terrorist actions, Gadhafi did not directly deny such involvement but appeared to defend 
it on the grounds that it balanced U.S. intervention elsewhere: 
"Why is Reagan involved wi th the contras in Nicaragua, with UNIT A in Angola, 
with Afghanistan? This is the same question. Let's all agree that everyone concern 
himself only with things in his own borders. "168 
It is also significant that the political causes of terrorism in the Middle East 
include the United States Government's comprehensive military and 
economic support for the State ofIsrae1.169 
The Gulf of Sidra is bounded by Libyan territory except for an opening 
to the Mediterranean on the north which is approximately ten times the width 
of the opening permitted for a "juridical bay" (24 nautical miles or less) under 
the jurisdiction of the adjoining state. I7O The Government of Libya has, 
nevertheless, claimed that the Gulf of Sidra is a part of its internal waters, 
and its principal domestic airline traverses the northern part of the Gulf 
between the two largest Libyan cities, Benghazi and Tripoli. Freedom of the 
seas in the Gulf of Sidra outside of the 12 mile limit has been successfully 
maintained for many years by diplomatic protest17l and by task forces of small 
combatant vessels of the British, French and U.S. Navies. In contrast, from 
late January until late March 1986, a 30 ship task force of the U.S. Sixth Fleet 
conducted surface and aerial operations in and adjacent to the Gulf of Sidra. 
From March 23 until March 26 three carrier battle groups, the Coral Sea, the 
Saratoga, and the America, operated in the same area, sinking Libyan missile 
boats and downing Libyan fighter aircraft which were claimed to approach 
with "hostile intent. "172 The Reagan Administration claimed publicly that 
this was a routine maintenance of the right of freedom of navigation, but 
accounts in the media stated that it was privately conceded to include a 
possible provocation. For example, Messrs. Hoffman and Cannon, writing 
in The Washington Post on March 25, 1986 stated: 
Although the White House claimed yesterday that the purpose of the naval exercise 
was solely to demonstrate freedom of navigation in an international waterway, officials 
said privately that the exercise was planned with a realization that it might provoke 
a military confrontation with Qaddafi and a chance to underscore Reagan's 
determination to deal firmly with international terrorism.173 
Previously the exercise of freedom of navigation in this area had not been 
provocative because it was maintained by small naval task forces. Such an 
exercise can become provocative, however, by using a larger force than that 
which is routine and necessary. 
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The bombing of the La Belle discotheque in West Berlin which followed 
on AprilS, 1986, caused the immediate deaths of a u.s. Army enlisted man 
and a young Turkish woman and injury to many others including U.S. military 
personnel. On the evening of April 14, the White House issued a statement 
that "In light of this reprehensible act of violence and clear evidence that 
Libya is planning future attacks, the United States has chosen to exercise its 
right of self-defense. "174 In an address to the nation on the same evenmg, 
President Reagan stated: 
This monstrous brutality is but the latest act in Colonel Qadhafi's reign of terror. The 
evidence is now conclusive that the terrorist bombing of La Belle discotheque was 
planned and executed under the direct orders of the Libyan regime .... Our evidence 
is direct; it is precise; it is irrefutable. We have solid evidence about other attacks Qadhafi 
has planned against the U.S. installations and diplomats and even American 
tourists .... Self-defense is not only our right, it is our duty .... We Americans are 
slow to anger. We always seek peaceful avenues before resorting to the use of force-
and we did.t75 
Seymour M. Hersh, an investigative reporter for the New York Times, wrote 
in February 1987: 
There was widespread concern and anger inside the National Security Agency over the 
Administration's handling of the Libyan messages intercepted immediately after the 
April 5 terrorist bombing of a West Berlin discotheque. The White House's reliance 
on these messages as "irrefutable" evidence that Libya was behind that bombing was 
immediately challenged by some allies, most notably West Germany. Some NSA experts 
now express similar doubts because the normal intelligence channels for translating and 
interpreting such messages were purposely bypassed. As of this month, the NSA's North 
African specialists had still not been shown these intercepts.176 
As an example of doubts expressed in Western Europe, the German source, 
Der Spiegel, published an article in April 1986 entitled "A Complexity of 
Findings-Secret Service Dispute Over Libyan Radio Messages. " The article 
stated that the "U.S. National Security Agency" and its German equivalent 
had reached opposite conclusions as to the meaning of the radio intercepts. 
One of its conclusions stated: 
Radio messages of such clarity which document a direct responsibility of the Libyan 
revolutionary leader Col. Muammar el Ghaddafi for the Berlin bombing were never 
recorded.1n 
Mr. Hersh, in the article quoted above, also stated: 
William J. Casey, then Director of Central Intelligence, personally served as the 
intelligence officer for a secret task force on Libya set up in mid-1981, and he provided 
intelligence that could not be confirmed by his subordinates. Some task force members 
suspected that much of Casey's information, linking Qaddafi to alleged "hit teams" that 
were said to be targeting President Reagan and other senior White House aides, was 
fabricated by him.t78 
In early 1986 a report, entitled Libya Under Qadhafi: A Pattern of Aggression 
and covering alleged Libyan terrorism through the December 1985 attacks 
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at the Rome and Vienna airports, set forth the State Department's 
understanding of the facts: 
The main targets of direct Libyan terrorist activities have been expatriate Libyan 
dissidents and leading officials of moderate Arab and African governments.179 
The report also states that these att~cks have taken place in many coU:ntries 
and that Libya has planned anti-exile attacks in the United States, but only 
one example is provided.180 There is a "Chronology of Libyan Support for 
Terrorism 1980-85//181 in the report which lists a total of 58 incidents, but only 
eight were alleged to involve direct action by Libya and of these none were 
stated to be directed against United States nationals. Two of the others 
referred to Libyan armed forces actions against Chad and one referred to 
the August 1981 incident in which two Libyan SU-22s were shot down by 
U.S. Navy aircraft. Some of the incidents appear to be based upon hearsay 
evidence which would not be admissible in a law court, although some are 
consistent with possible Libyan support for terrorism. A more recent State 
Department report issued in 1989182 accuses Libya of "Reaching for 
Respectability"183 and of conducting a "Drive for Influence, "184 but neither 
is in violation of international law and both are activities of most national 
states. The report contains a "Chronology of Libyan Support for Terrorism, 
1986-1988//185 with many of the incidents reported stated to be "believed" or 
"suspected." Like the earlier report, this one contains some statements which 
are consistent with possible Libyan support for terrorism. 
In summary, the State Department reports fail to produce factual evidence 
of direct Libyan terrorism against United States nationals, and the information 
provided concerning Libyan support for terrorism is equivocal. Consequently, 
the Reagan Administration's claims against the Libyan Government are not 
substantiated by the State Department's reports. 
The Vice President's Report on combating terrorism issued in early 1986 
refers to "the uncovering of a pro-Qaddafi conspiracy to carry out three 
assassinations and to bomb strategic locations in the United States"186 by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1985. The Report contains no details on 
this subject and the only other reference to Libya reports that Qaddafi stated 
that Libyans will attack "American citizens in their own streets. "187 If this 
were to happen, it would be within domestic jurisdiction and police power. 
Concerning international responses to terrorism, the Report states, inter alia: 
Political or economic sanctions directed against sponsoring states offer the least direct 
danger to lives and property and are more likely than military force to gain international 
support.1ss 
The United States has used such economic sanctions against Libya and has 
applied the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.189 
On April 14, 1986 the twelve ministers of foreign affairs of the European 
community issued an announcement at The Hague which stated, inter alia: 
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The Twelve have decided to act according to the following lines regarding Libya and, 
where necessary, regarding other states clearly implicated in supporting terrorism: 
- restrictions on the freedom of movement of diplomatic and consular personnel; 
- reduction of the staff of diplomatic and consular missions; 
- stricter visa requirements and procedures.l90 
The announcement added that no arms or other military equipment will be 
exported to Libya and that further measures will be considered as necessary. 
The Western Economic Summit meeting in Tokyo, May 4-6, 1986 issued 
"Declarations and statements by the seven Heads of State of Government 
and the representatives of the European Communities. "191 Concerning 
international terrorism, it was stated, inter alia: 
\Ve specify the following as measures open to any government concerned to deny to 
international terrorists the opportunity and the means to carry out their aims, and to 
identify and deter those who perpetrate such terrorism. We have decided to apply these 
measures within the framework of international law and in our own jurisdictions in 
respect of any state which is clearly involved in sponsoring or supporting international 
terrorism, and in particular of Libya, until such time as the state concerned abandons 
its complicity in, or support for, such terrorism.t92 
The "measures" included refusal to export arms, strict limits on the size of 
diplomatic missions, denial of entry to suspected persons including diplomatic 
personnel, improved extradition procedures, stricter immigration and visa 
requirements, and close bilateral and multilateral cooperation. 
A negotiating history of the Tokyo Summit which appeared in the New 
York Times193 stated that the specific mention of Libya was a last minute change 
inserted by the Summit leaders after the final draft declaration was presented 
to them. The European position was reported to be that terrorism could only 
be combatted effectively by understanding that it arose from legitimate 
political grievances but, nevertheless, the final text included the declaration 
that "terrorism has no justification. "194 An informal working paper stated 
to have been prepared by staff members of the United- States delegation 
conceded that one thing which might well motivate other countries to fight 
terrorism "is the need to do something so that the crazy Americans won't 
take matters into their own hands again. "195 
Whatever the motivations, it is clear that the European community's 
official position is that state supported terrorism exists and that Libya is one 
offender. Nothing in the community's position, however, provides support 
for military as opposed to economic and diplomatic sanctions. The New York 
Times reported that President Reagan stated on April 21, 1986, that President 
Mitterrand of France privately suggested that the United States make an all-
out military attack against Libya,196 This is not consistent with the French 
President's public position denying overflight rights for the aircraft flying 
from the United Kingdom to Libya. Apparently the Reagan Administration 
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did plan a comprehensive military attack upon Libya to be effectuated in 
cooperation with Egypt. An article in The Washington Post of April 2, 1986, 
by Bob Woodward stated, under the headline "u .S. Unable to Persuade Egypt 
to Back Plan for Joint Anti-Qaddafi Move": 
Eight months of secret U.S. efforts to win Egyptian approval for a U.S.-Egyptian 
military operation designed to overthrow Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi appear to 
have foundered following public disclosure and rejection of the plan by Cairo, informed 
sources said yesterday.l97 
2. Application of the International Law Requirements for Self-
Defense 
The same three basic requirements considered in the analysis of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis are applicable.19S They are: the use of peaceful procedures if 
possible; actual necessity for defense of the national state against an existing 
armed aggression or an imminent one; and proportionality in responding 
defensive measures. 
The media reported on the Libyan attempts to use peaceful procedures and 
the United States reaction. Fo; example, two weeks before the U.S. bombing 
attacks, David H. Ottaway reported on the Libyan attempts to open 
diplomatic discussions with the U.S. Government: 
In advance of Vice President Bush's trip to Saudi Arabia, Libyan leader Muammar 
Qaddafi sent two emissaries to Riyadh in an apparent attempt once again to open a 
dialogue with Washington in the wake of the U.S.-Libyan confrontation last week in 
the Gulf of Sidra. 
Administration officials said they had no intention of responding to Qaddafi's latest 
overture through the Saudis. They added that they have also rebuffed half a dozen other 
attempts by Libya to make contact with the United States through various European 
and Arab channels following the December 27 terrorist attacks on the Rome and Vienna 
airports .... 
The )Vould-be European and Arab mediators, including King Fahd himself, were 
firmly told in January that the administration was not interested either in "a direct or 
indirect dialogue" with Qaddafi, according to the sources. l99 
The Ottaway article also reports: 
The administration has also told various would-be mediators that it is not interested 
in striking any "deal" with Qaddafi whereby the Libyan leader would promise to end 
terrorist attacks against U.S. interests in return for improved relations with the United 
States, the official said .... 
In addition to King Fahd, Qaddafi also tried in January to enlist the support of the 
leaders of Greece, Austria, Malta, Italy and Morocco to open a dialogue with 
Washington.200 
Unfortunately, it is necessary to conclude from the events summarized that 
the Reagan Administration failed to take advantage of the several 
opportunities presented to it for peaceful resolution of the controversy in spite 
of President Reagan's statement to the contrary.201 Consequently, the United 
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States Government failed to comply with the first requirement to justify a 
claim of self-defense. 
The second requirement of the law of self-defense is that there be an 
existing armed aggression against the United States or an imminent one which 
is reasonably anticipated in the near future.202 The entire law of national self-
defense has been developed to protect a national state from armed aggression 
or an imminent threat of such aggression to its most basic values including 
its continued national existence and independence. Other legal doctrines, 
including the recognized right of a state to take limited measures to protect 
its nationals abroad, have been developed to deal with lesser injuries.203 The 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor provides an example of a then-existing armed 
aggression against the United States. An example of a reasonably anticipated 
imminent armed aggression is the threat to the United States from the 
clandestine attempted emplacement of Soviet inter-continental missiles with 
nuclear capability in Cuba. 
Both of these examples involved action by major military powers which 
was directed at the United States as a national entity. In contrast, the claims 
of President Reagan set forth above204 refer to injury or threatened injury 
from a state which has a trivial military capacity in comparison with that 
of the United States and only concern alleged past and future attacks on 
individual U.S. citizens rather than the United States as a whole. If a basis 
for the claim of self-defense can be the probability of future Libyan terrorism, 
then one is forced to consider possible future acts which are much harder 
to ascertain than the alleged unclear past events. In evaluating past events, 
even if it were assumed that Libya was responsible for the bombing at the 
La Belle discotheque, the attack on Benghazi and Tripoli several days later 
could not be self-defense to that bombing as an imminent threat.205 
The determination of whether or not Libyan actions constituted a 
meaningful threat to the United States should also consider the role of other 
states in activities termed "terrorism." George C. Wilson and Fred Hiatt, 
writing on March 26, 1986, stated that: 
u.s. intelligence showed that Iran and Syria probably were more involved in the recent 
acts of terrorism, but those countries were not the visible symbols of evil that Qaddafi 
presented. A demonstration of U.S. resolve was necessary and Libya was singled out.206 
The persistence of such reports was reflected in an interview with Secretary 
of State Shultz. Lesley Stahl interviewed the Secretary on CBS-TV's "Face 
the Nation" on January 12, 1986: 
Q. There are reports now that investigators in Europe believe that the terrorists who 
perpetrated the bombing in Rome and Vienna did not come from training camps in 
Libya, but came from camps in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley, and then came 
through Syria into Europe. Are there second thoughts within our government about 
just exactly how much Libya is to blame for this latest terrorist act?207 
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Secretary Shultz replied, in part, "No. Libya is clearly supporting terrorism 
in general." In the balance of a long answer he did not mention Syria. The 
questioner persisted: 
Q. Now, what about Syrian involvement? Just how much is that government 
responsible? 
A. Syria's picture is a rather different one. I would remind you that Syria has long 
been on our terrorist list, but Syria's behavior toward all of these things is rather different 
from Libya's. 
Q. In what sense? How is it different? 
A. In their public attitudes, and because we are working with Syria on a number of 
fronts in a constructive way.208 
In Secretary Shultz' news conference on January 9, 1986, he was asked a 
question about the Iranian role: 
Q. Why the narrow focus on Libya when our own intelligence community has singled 
out Iran, for example, as a country that trains terrorists, a country that has taken 
American lives over the past several years in places like Lebanon? Why the lashing out 
on this one subject and not tackling the others? 
A. Libya is a country that has been, is, and no doubt will continue to be involved in 
terrorist activities .... Insofar as Iran is concerned, we are as concerned anywhere 
about terrorist activities. We are talking about Libya in this instance. We have very 
little trade with Iran .... w 
Secretary Shultz did not state that the "little trade" he referred to was 
principally the Reagan Administration's then secret weapons shipments to 
Iran.210 The supply of weapons to Iran, of course, made it unrealistic to treat 
that country as Libya was being treated. There were also compelling reasons 
to treat Syria differently. During the Israeli armed attack on the Palestine 
Liberation Organization and Lebanon in 1982, Israel attacked and destroyed 
a large part of the Syrian Air Force and the Syrian air defense system. 
Thereafter, the Soviet Union reinforced its ties with Syria and rebuilt the 
air defense system.211 The result was that in 1986 Syria possessed a much more 
significant defense system than it did in 1982 and an attack on Syria would 
be much more costly to the attacker than would an attack on Libya. In addition 
to other reasons, Libya was apparently selected for its military weakness 
which made it a less credible threat to the United States than either Iran or 
Syria. 
While it is not unlawful to select a weak target in order to minimize 
casualties to one's own forces, the matter must also be evaluated in terms 
of the proportionality of probable ancillary civilian casualties. It is impossible 
to support the finding of President Reagan in his Executive Order of January 
7, 1986, that the Government of Libya constitutes "an unusual and 
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United 
States. "212 There was simply no threat to the national security, and if there 
were a threat to foreign policy, it would not justify responding military 
measures. Because of these considerations, it is impossible to conclude that 
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the United States complied with the legal requirement of an existing or 
imminently anticipated armed aggression against it. 
The third essential element of a valid claim of national self-defense is 
proportionality in responding measures. Because of the failure to use available 
peaceful procedures and the absence of actual necessity, it would be 
unnecessary to consider the issue of proportionality. Even if the first two 
requirements for self-defense had been met, there is considerable doubt that 
the intense use of military coercion in a responding bombing attack could 
be appraised as proportional. One reason for this doubt is that following the 
bombing attacks it became clear that the United States had killed and injured 
many more Libyans (both civilian and military personnel with no indication 
that any of the victims were involved in any acts of terrorism) than the number 
of Americans that Libya was accused of either killing or providing support 
for their killing. 
U.S. Navy Regulations, which are routinely treated as law in many contexts 
including court martial proceedings, are issued by the Secretary of the Navy 
following the approval of the President.213 Article 0915 entitled "Use of Force 
Against Another State" provides in relevant part: 
The right of self-defense must be exercised only as a last resort, and then only to the 
extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish the end required. 
Force must never be used with a view to inflicting punishment for acts already 
committed.214 
In summary, it is very difficult to find legal support for the Reagan 
Administration's claim that the bombing attack is justified as self-defense. 
3. Application of the International Law of Reprisal 
It is sometimes suggested that the law of self-defense is inadequate to 
provide protection against contemporary acts and threats of terrorism and 
that the law concerning reprisals is more relevant.215 The traditional law on 
the subject has three requirements for an act of reprisal to be justified: (1) 
a response to a violation of international law; (2) an unsatisfied demand for 
termination of the violation; and (3) a proportion between the original 
violation and the act of the reprisal.216 There is some evidence that there may 
have been a violation of international law by Libyan support for terrorism, 
and apparently the Reagan Administration carried out the bombing on the 
basis that the original violation had not been terminated, although they did 
not at any time claim that the raids were reprisals. The most serious difficulty 
with application of the law of reprisal is the third requirement of 
proportionality. 
The Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons (1949)217 
prohibits reprisals against protected civilian persons. In addition, the well-
established customary law prohibits attacks upon civilians. It is clear that the 
United States bombing attacks were not directed at civilians as such. 
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Nevertheless, it must have been apparent that the selection of claimed military 
targets in such close proximity to civilian residences and the French Embassy 
presented the gravest danger to civilians. The results of the bombing in civilian 
casualties raise substantial doubt as to whether the requirement of 
proportionality for reprisals was met. 
4. Application of the Law of Targeting 
The failure of the claim of self-defense and the serious doubts concerning 
justification as reprisal mean that there is no clear legal authority for attacking 
Libyan objectives. It is essential, nevertheless, to examine the bombing attacks 
under the criteria of the law of targeting. 
The operational plan for the bombing of Libya was termed EI Dorado 
Canyon. Because of the denial of over-flight rights by European countries, 
except Great Britain, the Air Force F-111 aircraft from Lakenheath Air Base 
in England flew around the west coast of the Iberian Peninsula, entering the 
Mediterranean at the Strait of Gibraltar, and after repeated refuelings, 
attacked targets in Tripoli. The Navy aircraft from the carriers attacked 
targets in Benghazi. 
There were five targets specified for the bombing attack: (1) Benina air 
field at Benghazi where some Libyan military aircraft were on the ground; 
(2) Benghazi Barracks-the site of Qaddafi's alternate headquarters and 
command post; (3) Tripoli International Airport where some Libyan military 
transport aircraft were on the ground; (4) Sidi Bilal military facility in 
Tripoli-claimed to be a terrorist training school (Libya claimed that it is 
a school for naval cadets); and (5) Azziziyah compound in Tripoli-Qaddafi's 
main headquarters and his family's home.218 Following interviews over a 
period of three months with more than 70 of the officials planning the attack, 
Seymour Hersh concludes that Col. Qaddafi was the primary target.219 
Qaddafi was not hit, but Hersh reports concerning his family: 
All eight of Qaddafi's children, as well as his wife, Safiya, were hospitalized, suffering 
from shock and various injuries. His 15-month-old adopted daughter, Hanna, died several 
hours after the raid.22/) 
President Reagan's executive order number 12,333, section 2.11, entitled 
"Prohibition on Assassination" states that "No person employed by or acting 
on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to 
engage in, assassination. "221 Referring to this order in the context of the 
Libyan attacks, and particularly the bombing of the Qaddafi family living 
quarters, one commentator stated: 
If the raid was in fact a veiled execution attempt, it would pit the Reagan Administration 
against a specific presidential order and substantial legal precedent. In 1976, after public 
discontent over the revelations of CIA assassination attempts in Chile, Guatemala and 
Iran, President Ford issued an Executive Order forbidding the Government from 
authorizing the assassination of world leaders. Both Presidents Carter and Reagan have 
reaffirmed that ban.222 
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Aviation Week & Space Technology reported under the headline, "U.S. 
Demonstrates Advanced Weapons Technology in Libya," that a senior 
military official stated shortly after the attack: 
"Understandably, after the all-Navy action in Libya last month, the Air Force wanted 
a piece of the action." The official added, "The fact that the Defense Dept. budget 
is under consideration-and here was an opportunity to show how well the money is 
being spent on aircraft and weapons-was not overlooked by both services as a side 
benefit to the mission. Another reason to include the F-l11s in the operation was that 
it showed the support of Great Britain for our antiterrorist activities. ''223 
At his joint press conference with Secretary Shultz the evening of April 
14, 1986, Secretary of Defense Weinberger said in his introductory comment: 
We used a combination of SOO-pound and 2,OOO-pound laser-guided weapons and 
precision-guided delayed gravity bombs. All of the Navy planes have returned without 
casualty. All of the F-ll1s with one exception, have been accounted for and are 
returning .... The attack was carried out precisely as planned, and it was, as the 
President said, evidence of very great skill, both navigational as well as the organization 
of the attack which was a difficult one from the professional point of view and done 
with great effectiveness .... 224 
During the ensuing question period, the following took place: 
Q. There was also a report that you hit part of the French Embassy in Libya. Do you 
know anything about that report? 
A. Secretary Weinberger. That would be, I think, virtually impossible.225 
David Blundy and Andrew Lycett, have reported on both the rules of 
engagement and the civilian casualties.226 
The rules of engagement for Operation Eldorado Canyon had been strictly 
formulated, or so it was claimed in the official U.S. explanation to the British Cabinet: 
the planes should strike only targets that could be precisely defined and shown to be 
related to terrorist and military activity. The weapons officer in each plane had to have 
a 'double lock-on' before he could release his bombs, which meant that he had to fix 
the target, not only with his forward looking infra-red night sight, but also with his 
Pave Track radar. Any plane which failed to achieve this was under orders to leave 
the target area and jettison its bombs over the sea .... 
At least a dozen bombs and missiles fell in the area of Bin Ashur a [suburb of Tripoli], 
making craters ten feet deep, knocking out the front of an apartment building and scoring 
direct hits on private villas. The house next to the French embassy was destroyed and 
the embassy itself severely damaged. One bomb or missile landed in the center of a 
park and children's playground. A child's foot was sticking out of the rubble of one 
building. The body of an old man was fixed in a crouch as if he had been getting out 
of bed when the bombs hit. Another old man lay on a stretcher outside his villa, killed 
by falling rubble. It was a gruesome sight.227 
In another account, David C. Martin and John Walcott report similar civilian 
damage and conclude that: "Measured by the bomb-damage assessment, the 
raid was less than impressive."228 The newspapers reported various 
inaccuracies in the bombing. For example, Edward Schumacher, reported in 
the New York Times: 
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More than a dozen bombs and missiles from the American air raids early Tuesday appear 
to have missed an air base and hit two farms about two miles away according to evidence 
seen by reporters on visits to the farms today.229 
Unfortunately, aerial bombardment even with the most advanced technology 
remains a very blunt instrument. Operational planners of "surgical strikes," 
employing "pin-point accuracy," and "precision delivered munitions," 
should recognize that results consistent with such plans are seldom manifested 
in an actual bombardment. 
Even though there was no prior armed conflict between the United States 
and Libya, the armed attack brought into effect the law of armed conflict. 
Ever since the Prize Cases,230 decided by the U.S. Supreme Court during the 
Civil War, the law of armed conflict has been applicable to the fact of an 
international armed conflict including episodes of hostilities without requiring 
a so-called technical state of war. Therefore, Hague Convention (IX) 
Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War (1907),231 is 
applicable to the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi. It prohibits bombing of 
undefended locations, and military targets in Tripoli and Benghazi were 
defended even though the Libyan defenses were weak in comparison with 
the military technology and the weight of the ordnance employed against 
them. Article 6 of the Convention provides: 
If the military situation permits, the commander of the attacking naval force, before 
commencing the bombardment, must do his utmost to warn the authorities. 
In the bombardment of the Iranian oil platforms in the Persian Gulf, 
considered previously,232 prior notice was given so that the personnel would 
evacuate the platform. In the attacks on Tripoli and Benghazi a probable 
objective was to kill Libyan personnel alleged to be involved in terrorist 
training activities and so no warning was given. In view of the ambiguous 
language concerning "[i]f the military situation permits," it is not clear that 
Hague Convention IX required a warning. The unfortunate result, however, 
in addition to the killing of Libyan military personnel who possibly had no 
connection with terrorism, was the killing of a substantial number of 
civilians.233 
The Navy Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations ("NWP 9") 
under the heading "Incidental Injury and Collateral Damage" provides the 
legal criteria of the well-established customary international law: 
It is not unlawful to cause incidental injury or death to civilians, or collateral damage 
to civilian objects, during an attack upon a legitimate military objective. Incidental 
injury or collateral damage should not, however, be excessive in light of the military 
advantage anticipated by the attack. Naval commanders must take all practicable 
precautions, taking into account military and humanitarian considerations, to keep 
civilian casualties and damage to the absolute minimum consistent with mission 
accomplishment and the security of the force.234 
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This legal standard is easier to apply in an on-going international conflict 
than it is to the attacks on Tripoli and Benghazi. The first difficulty here 
is to determine whether the military objectives which were targeted 
constituted "a legitimate military objective." It is also difficult to identify 
the lawful "military advantage" which was anticipated by this attack. 
Consequently, it is impossible to relate incidental "injury or collateral 
damage" to civilian persons or objects to such a "military advantage." Rather 
than seeking military advantage in the attack, the stated objective of the 
Reagan Administration was to deter claimed Libyan terrorism against U.S. 
citizens and the hard fact remained that no such direct terrorism was credibly 
proven to exist either before or after the bombing attack.235 
A State Department "Fact Sheet" entitled Libya's Qaddafi Continues Support 
for Terrorism contains charges against Libya for the years 1986-1988.236 It states 
Qaddafi conducts terrorism against Libyan dissidents237 and that Libya's 
foreign policy and diplomatic objectives are inconsistent with those of the 
United States.238 It includes a "Chronology of Libyan Support for Terrorism 
1986-1988," which details thirty incidents in which "Libyan involvement" 
was often stated to be "suspected" but without a single incident involving 
a direct Libyan attack on U.S. citizens, although several attacks conducted 
by others against U.S. citizens or interests are stated to be supported by Libya 
but without any evidence.239 Of the thirty incidents, four are listed as involving 
"Americans. " Concerning the bombing at the La Belle discotheque, the "Fact 
Sheet" states: "The U.S. Government announced it had direct evidence of 
Libyan complicity in the attack. "240 There can be no question but that this 
was "announced," but the evidence of complicity is, on the most favorable 
view, equivocal. Of course, it is possible that there was secret evidence which 
cannot be considered in this analysis.241 
In summary, even if there had been clear legal authority to bomb Benghazi 
and Tripoli, and full acknowledgment is accorded to the tactical effort to 
engage only in "precision bombing," the results achieved in the killing of 
civilians probably violate the law. The existence of ancillary civilian casualties 
which occur as a result of the lawful targeting of military objectives is not 
unlawful. The key issue concerns proportionality. On the basis of the 
information about the attacks on Benghazi and Tripoli, it is not possible to 
conclude with assurance that the customary law standard of avoiding 
excessive, that is, disproportionate, injury or death to civilians was met by 
the targeting.242 
Authors' Postscript Concerning Subsequent Possible Evidence of 
Libyan Involvement in the Bombing of LaBelle Discotheque 
Since the completion of the text on this subject there have been some 
references in the media to possible Libyan involvement in the bombing. Most 
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of the reports indicate that some agents of the former East German secret 
police, "Stasi", state the existence of a Libyan connection. Among the 
examples are accoun~s in Time magazine of July 23, 1990 ("World Notes" 
at p. 54, cols. 1-2), the Washington Post of June 21, 1990 (p. A27, cols. 4-5 
cont. at p. A30, col. 1) and the New York Times of July 15, 1990 (p. 6, cols. 
1-6) and July 28,1990 (p. A4, cols. 4-5). 
Two facts must be established to provide legal justification for the military 
response by the Reagan Administration. The first is unequivocal evidence of 
significant Libyan involvement. The second is equally unequivocal evidence 
of knowledge of this before the decision to respond militarily was made. Since 
most of the reports emanate from the former Stasi, this would require that 
the Reagan Administration was privy to Stasi sources. 
In the event that both were to be established, significant major issues 
concerning the law of self-defense and of targeting would remain. 
VI. The Basic Principles of the Law of Naval Targeting 
It is now practicable to set forth the contemporary rules oflaw concerning 
naval targeting based upon the development of the customary law in the 
W orld Wars and subsequently and upon the treaty law including the London 
Protocol (1936) and Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces 
at Sea (1949). Because the law applies equally to surface and submarine 
warships and military aircraft, a single set of basic rules may be formulated. 
The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (NWP 9) adopts a 
different approach by setting forth separate targeting rules for "Surface 
Warfare, "243 "Submarine Warfare "244 and" Air Warfare at Sea. "245 Although 
the rules are substantially similar, the separate treatment is apparently 
designed to indicate that different weapons platforms operate in distinct 
tactical environments. 
The general principles of the law of armed conflict are, of course, applicable 
to naval targeting. In addition to the basic principles of military necessity 
and humanity conceived as a single principle of avoiding unnecessary 
destruction of human and material values,246 and the Martens Clause247 which 
specifies that when the situation is not covered by an existing rule the parties 
to the conflict remain bound by the customary international law and the usages 
established by the community of states, the following are applicable: 
1. The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not 
unlimited. 
2. It is prohibited to direct attacks against the civilian population as such. 
3. The basic distinction between combatants and non-combatants must be 
made.248 
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A. Enemy Warships and Military Aircraft 
Enemy warships and military aircraft (including naval and military 
auxiliaries) may lawfully be the objects of attack, destruction, or capture 
anywhere outside of neutral territory. Since such warships and aircraft are 
valuable military assets, their capture is always desirable if tactically possible. 
It is unlawful to refuse quarter to an enemy attempting to surrender in good 
faith.249 When an enemy warship has clearly indicated the intention to 
surrender by hauling down its flag or hoisting a white flag, or by stopping 
engines, or by responding to the attacker's directions, or by taking to lifeboats, 
or in any other manner, the attack must be stopped. In many tactical situations 
a submarine indicates surrender by coming to the surface. Manifestation of 
surrender by an aircraft is especially difficult. However, if a good faith offer 
to surrender is made, it must be accepted. One such manifestation would be 
a willingness to land the aircraft in the territory of the attacker. It is not 
necessary to formally adjudicate the transfer of title of a captured enemy 
warship' or military aircraft since such ownership vests immediately in the 
captor's government by the act of capture.250 
B. Enemy Merchant Vessels and Civilian Aircraft and Neutral Merchant Vessels 
and Civilian Aircraft which are Participating in the Enemy Armed Conflict Effort 
Such merchant vessels and civilian aircraft are valuable assets and should 
be captured if possible whenever they are located outside of neutral territory. 
The use of visit and search is not required if identification of status can be 
made by electronic or other means. If the military situation following a 
capture prevents the sending or taking in of such a vessel or aircraft for 
adjudication, it may be destroyed after adequate measures are taken for the 
safety of crew and passengers.251 All documents and papers relating to the 
captured vessels or aircraft should be safeguarded and each case of destruction 
should be reported promptly to higher command.252 If capture is militarily 
impracticable, the vessel or aircraft may be attacked and destroyed if it falls 
under one of the following categories:253 
1. Refusing to stop or follow directions upon being ordered to do so; 
2. Actively resisting visit and search or capture; 
3. Sailing under convoy of enemy warships or enemy military aircraft; 
4. If incorporated into or assisting the intelligence system of the enemy 
armed forces; 
5. If acting as a naval or military auxiliary to the enemy armed forces; 
6. If participating in the enemy war effort.254 
C. Certain Enemy and Neutral Merchant Vessels and Civil Aircraft Which are 
Immune from Attack 
The characterization of particular merchant vessels and civil aircraft as 
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"enemy" does not, without more, make them lawful objects of attack. Neutral 
merchant vessels and civil aircraft comprise two distinct categories: those 
participating in and those not participating in the enemy war effort.255 The 
following categories of vessels and aircraft are immune from attack: 
1. Enemy merchant vessels and civil aircraft which are not participating 
directly in the enemy armed conflict effort; 
Example: Such a vessel or aircraft which is away from the main area of combat 
operations in a location where visit and search, electronic or other identification, or 
orders to land may be employed. 
2. Neutral merchant vessels and civil aircraft which are not participating 
in the enemy armed conflict effort; 
Example: A neutral merchant ship or civil aircraft engaged in genuine inter-neutral 
trade or the transportation of civilian passengers. 
3. Vessels and aircraft designated for and engaged in the exchange of 
prisoners (cartel vessels); 
4. Vessels and aircraft guaranteed safe conduct by agreement of the parties 
to the conflict; 
5. Properly designated and marked hospital ships, medical transports, and 
medical aircraft; 
6. Vessels and civil aircraft engaged in philanthropic or non-military 
scientific missions; 
7. Small coastal fishing boats and small boats engaged in local coastal trade. 
Such boats are subject to reasonable order of the naval commander in control 
of the area as, for example, an order to depart from the immediate area of 
combat operations.256 
D. Naval Bombardment 
"Bombardmen~" is used here to refer to naval bombardment by surface 
or submarine warships or by naval or military aircraft of enemy targets on 
land. All contemporary methods of bombardment including gunfire, rockets, 
missiles, and bombs are included. Prior to the World Wars, bombardment 
of shore objects by naval gunfire was an incident of many armed conflicts. 
It was employed again in both World Wars, and from 1939 to 1945 naval 
gunfire was used as the spearhead of Allied amphibious operations. The basic 
rules of naval targeting considered above are also applicable here.257 
The United States is a party to Hague Convention (IX) Concerning 
Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War (1907).258 Its article 1(1) 
provides: "The bombardment by naval forces of undefended ports, towns, 
villages, dwellings, or buildings is forbidden." Article 2 states that military 
objectives, even in undefended locations, are not immunized from naval 
bombardment. Although aviation was in a primitive stage of development 
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in 1907, this Hague Convention applies comprehensively to bombardment and 
therefore includes aerial bombardment. Of course, the customary law rule 
of proportionality, that incidental civilian casualties and damage must be 
limited to that which is proportional to the military advantage to be expected 
from the attack, is applicable to naval bombardment as it is to all armed 
conflict. Consequently, the deliberate or wanton destruction of areas of 
concentrated civilian habitation is prohibited. 
The parties to a conflict may immunize particular demilitarized zones by 
specific agreement. Medical personnel and facilities are always immunized 
unless they are used in violation of law for military purposes. It is also well 
established customary law that buildings devoted to religious, cultural and 
charitable purposes are not lawful objects of attack.259 The following rules 
are based upon customary law and the established practices of the community 
of states, portions of which have been codified in treaties: 
1. Bombardment for the purpose of terrorizing the civilian population is 
prohibited. 
2. The wanton or deliberate destruction of areas of civilian habitation 
including cities, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings is prohibited. 
3. A demilitarized zone agreed to by the parties to the conflict is exempt 
from bombardment. 
4. Medical facilities including medical establishments and units, medical 
vehicles, equipment and stores may not be made the objects of bombardment. 
The distinctive medical emblem, either a red cross, a red crescent or the red 
lion and sun, should be clearly displayed in order to facilitate immunity. Any 
object identified otherwise as a medical facility is also immune from 
bombardment even if it is not marked with the protective symbol. 
5. Hospital zones established by agreement of the parties to the conflict 
are Immune. 
6. All religious, cultural or charitable facilities or buildings are not lawful 
objects ofbombardment.260 The distinctive emblem to protect such facilities 
or buildings is a rectangle divided diagonally into two triangular halves with 
the upper portion black and the lower portion white.261 Any object identified 
otherwise as such a facility is also immune from bombardment even if it is 
not marked with the protective symbol. 
7. It is prohibited to bomb installations which if destroyed would release 
forces harmful to the civilian population if the probable harm to civilians 
would be excessive in relation to the military advantage to be achieved by 
bombardment. Such installations include nuclear and other power plants as 
well as dams, dikes, and similar objects.262 
8. Whenever the military situation permits, commanders are obligated to 
make every effort to warn the civilian population located in proximity to 
a military objective which is the target of bombardment. Warnings should 
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be specific, if possible, but a general warning is permissible if a more specific 
one would jeopardize the mission of the bombarding force.263 
E. Enforcement of the Law 
The law of targeting illustrates the practicality of the law of armed conflict, 
promoting military efficiency by designating military personnel and objects 
as lawful targets while minimizing unnecessary destruction of human and 
material values through prohibiting attacks on civilian persons and objects. 
The basic principles of the law of naval targeting have remained constant 
while being applied to changing technology including the development of 
submarines, aircraft and nuclear weapons. These principles apply to 
contemporary over-the-horizon weapons systems which must be employed 
, so as to protect civilian persons and objects from disproportionate ancillary 
casualties and damage. A thoughtful naval historian has recently concluded 
that future armed conflict at sea will be conducted almost exclusively under 
water by diverse types of submarine warships.264 
It is sometimes suggested that a law of armed conflict of ideal doctrinal 
content would emphasize the principle of humanity over considerations of 
military necessity. Such a law would break down in actual practice and would 
be much less effective in protecting human and material values than the 
existing law which takes account of the full range of legitimate military 
interests. A basic sanction of the law of armed conflict is the common self-
interest of the participants that more is to be gained by adhering to the law 
than by violating it. There is also an important element of reciprocity and 
mutuality in observance.26s The alternative to enforcement of the law is not 
only the unnecessary destruction of human and material values in armed 
conflict, but a chaotic international system which requires the entire world 
community to live under the threat of impending nuclear disaster. 
The United States has, throughout its history with few exceptions, been 
a leader in the development and enforcement of international law including 
the law of armed conflict. Because military necessity has been taken into 
account in formulating the legal rules such claimed necessity cannot be 
invoked as a device to repeal or modify them. It is not possible to ascertain 
a military advantage, much less a military necessity, in four of the examples 
considered in this study: the bombing of a submarine engaged in rescue 
operations, the killings following the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, the 
prohibition of North Korean coastal fishing, and the April 1986 bombing of 
Libya. 
In spite of these instances, the United States Government, and the Navy, 
as well as the other Armed Services, continue to emphasize the importance 
of the entire law of armed conflict and the key enforcement role of line 
officers. The mandatory instructions requiring observance of the law, the 
manuals explaining the law, including the legally accurate and militarily 
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practical Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations,266 and the 
reliance on officers of the Judge Advocate General's Corps who are specialists 
in international law all facilitate the line officer's role. 
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